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Inunigration Control in an Era of
Globalization: Deflecting Foreigners,
Weakening Citizens, Strengthening the State
VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS*
ABSTRACT
In stark contrast to the field of legislation on the rights of third-
country nationals or to the requirements and conditions for access to the
territory of states, the field of the enforcement of immigration control has
been increasingly subject to legal harmonization: either by the adoption
of global law on immigration control or by the convergence of domestic
law and policy in the field. This convergence is particularly marked
when one compares legal responses to immigration control in the United
States and the European Union, where globalization has been used to
justify the extension of state power-by proclaiming state action
necessary in order to address perceived global security threats-and the
use of key features of globalization that may facilitate free movement-
such as the use of technology-in order to enhance immigration control.
Globalization has led to the strengthening, rather than the weakening, of
the state. This strengthening of the state has significant consequences not
only for immigration but also for citizenship as expressed by both
relations between individuals and between citizens and the state. By
examining the global and transatlantic policy and legislative consensus
on immigration control, this Article will cast light on the challenges the
extension of state power that globalized immigration control entails for
fundamental rights and the rule of law.
INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZATION AND THE LAW OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL
The aim of this Article is to explore how the law of immigration
control has been transformed in a globalized world. While immigration
control has traditionally been perceived as the prerogative of the state
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and as a prime example of the exercise of state sovereignty via state
power, globalization has challenged this assumption by questioning
territorial borders and facilitating the movement of people around the
world. This perception of globalization as a facilitator of immigration-
including undesired mobility on the part of the receiving states-has led
to the development of a series of legislative measures aimed at
enhancing border controls. In stark contrast to the field of legislation on
the rights of third-country nationals or to the requirements and
conditions for access to the territory of states, the field of the
enforcement of immigration control has been increasingly subject to
legal harmonization: either by the adoption of global law on
immigration control or by the convergence of domestic law and policy in
the field. This convergence is particularly marked when one compares
legal responses to immigration control in the United States and the
European Union and is based on a transatlantic consensus on the need
to extend the powers of the state-both in terms of capacity and in
terms of territorial reach-in order to address global flows of people. A
key element of this strategy is the use of globalization to justify the
extension of state power-by proclaiming state action necessary in order
to address perceived global security threats-and the use of key features
of globalization that may facilitate movement-such as the use of
technology-in order to enhance immigration control. In this manner,
globalization has led to the strengthening, rather than the weakening,
of the state.
This Article will attempt to demonstrate that this strengthening of
the state has significant consequences not only for immigration, but also
for citizenship as expressed by both relations between individuals and
between citizens and the state. By examining the global and
transatlantic policy and legislative consensus on immigration control,
this Article will cast light on the challenges the extension of state power
that globalized immigration control entails for fundamental rights and
the rule of law.
I. GLOBALIZATION, IMMIGRATION CONTROL, AND SECURITY
Writing on the link between "illegal" immigration and globalization,
Catherine Dauvergne has noted that
[t]he impression that the problem of illegal migration is
a global one, and the fact that those who seek to migrate
outside the law have access to a geographically broader
range of options than in earlier eras, contribute to the
4
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construction of an identity category of people named by
the new noun "illegal."'
This link between globalization and the perceived facilitation of
unwanted movement it entails has justified the enhancement of
immigration control in the West. Going a step further and looking
beyond the debate over illegality in immigration law, this part will
demonstrate how immigration control has been transformed by shaping
state responses to counter perceived global security threats. Rather
than focusing only on countering "illegal" movement (or, as Dauvergne
puts it, "migration outside the law"), immigration control here focuses
more generally on countering movement which is considered
"dangerous" or a security threat. This securitized approach, which links
migration and movement to evils such as transnational organized crime
and terrorism, has enabled the development of a global enforcement
consensus. The translation of this consensus into legislation has
signified a considerable extension of state power at the expense of rights
not only of foreigners but also of citizens: as will be demonstrated below,
in particular in the case of counterterrorism, securitized immigration
controls have shifted the focus from immigration control of third-
country nationals at the physical border to the generalized surveillance
of third-country nationals and citizens alike.
A. Immigration Control as a Response to the Threat of Transnational
Organized Crime
The securitization of immigration control in a global context is
evident in the first major multilateral convention aiming to develop
global legal norms to counter the threat of transnational organized
crime. Reflecting the post-Cold War framing of transnational organized
crime as a global security threat in need of urgent countermeasures, 2
the response of the international community has been the adoption of
the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime,
symbolically signed in Palermo in 2000 (Palermo Convention).
Negotiated throughout the 1990s, the Palmero Convention is an
ambitious and comprehensive multilateral instrument aiming at
combating and preventing organized crime. It contains provisions
ranging from the criminalization of participation in an organized crime
1. CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL: WHAT GLOBALISATION MEANS
FOR MIGRATION AND LAW 19 (2008).
2. See generally VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS ET AL., THE EUROPEAN UNION AND INTERNAL
SEcURITY: GUARDIAN OF THE PEOPLE? 42-59 (2003) (discussing the securitization of
organized crime).
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group, money laundering, and corruption to provisions on judicial
cooperation with regard to organized crime, police cooperation, and the
law of criminal procedure. The Convention is complemented by three
protocols on human trafficking, human smuggling, and the illicit
manufacturing and trafficking in firearms. Following the model of the
Convention, the Protocols also contain provisions on criminalization and
enforcement.3
It is by no coincidence that the first major global legal instrument
adopted by the international community on immigration control was
prompted by security considerations. As Anne Gallagher has noted,
"[w]hile human rights concerns may have provided some impetus (or
cover) for collective action, it was clearly the sovereignty/security issues
surrounding trafficking and migrant smuggling, as well as the perceived
link with organized criminal groups operating across national borders,
that provided the true driving force behind such efforts."4 Rather than
focusing on the immigrant, the Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols
were justified primarily on the basis of the need to protect states from
transnational criminality. This "securitized" approach has been
criticized heavily for effectively criminalizing migration and extending
the reach of the state, with James Hathaway arguing that "the focus of
the transnational effort against human trafficking on the prevention of
cross-border movements created a legal slippery slope in which it proved
possible to set a transnational duty to criminalize not only 'human
trafficking' . . . but also the much broader phenomenon of human
smuggling,"5 and that the U.N. intervention is really a pretext for the
globalization of border control.6
1. The Case of Trafficking in Human Beings
To a great extent, a close examination of the Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children (Trafficking Protocol) does justice to the above claims. While it
is true that the Protocol focuses on the criminalization of trafficking and
3. See, e.g., DAVID MCCLEAN, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: A COMMENTARY ON
THE UN CONVENTION AND ITS PROTOCOLS (2007) (providing legal analysis on the text of
the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime); see also Dimitri Viassis,
Drafting the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, in
COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: CONCEPTS, ACTIVITIES AND RESPONSES 356, 356-62
(Phil Williams & Dimitri Vlassis eds., 2001) (discussing the adoption of the convention).
4. ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 71 (2010).
5. James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of 'Human Trafficking," 49 VA.
J. IN'L L. 1, 5 (2008). But see Anne T. Gallagher, Human Rights and Human Trafficking:
Quagmire or Firm Ground? A Response to James Hathaway, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 789 (2009).
6. Hathaway, supra note 5, at 25-35.
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the prosecution and punishment of the traffickers and not the trafficked
persons,7 the Protocol does trigger a raft of enforcement measures8 and
the provisions on the rights of trafficked persons have been drafted with
the interests of the state firmly in mind. While the Trafficking Protocol
does contain a separate part on the protection of victims,9 the latter
includes a provision on repatriation'o and the two provisions aiming at
granting rights to victims in the receiving state render these rights
largely conditional upon the discretion of the signatory states. Article 6
of the Protocol on Assistance to and Protection of Victims of Trafficking
obliges states to inter alia, "[i]n appropriate cases and to the extent
possible under its domestic law. . . protect the privacy and identity of
victims of trafficking in persons, including, inter alia, by making legal
proceedings relating to such trafficking confidential" (emphasis
added);" to introduce measures to "provide to victims. . . in appropriate
cases: (a) Information on relevant court and administrative proceedings;
(b) Assistance to enable their views and concerns to be presented and
considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings" (emphasis
added);12 and "to consider implementing measures to provide for the
physical, psychological and social recovery of victims of trafficking"
(emphasis added).13 On the other hand, Article 7(1) of the Protocol on
the Status of Victims of Trafficking in Persons in Receiving States calls
upon states to "consider adopting legislative or other appropriate
measures that permit victims of trafficking in persons to remain in its
territory, temporarily or permanently, in appropriate cases" (emphasis
added).' 4 In implementing the above provision, states must "give
appropriate consideration to humanitarian and compassionate
factors."' 5
The Trafficking Protocol thus links the rights of victims of
trafficking with security of residence under the immigration law in the
receiving state. This approach has been criticized by Elspeth Guild, who
points out that "[b]y focusing on the foreignness of the victim, which is
determined by the fact of the border crossing and the lack of a right of
7. See Article 5 on Criminalization, in conjunction with the use of terms as defined in
Article 3, in Trafficking Protocol, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25, at 32-
33 (Jan. 8, 2001).
8. See Articles 9-13, id. at 35-37. Note, however, the human rights and
nondiscrimination saving clause in Article 14, id. at 37.
9. See Articles 6-8, id. at 33-35.
10. See Article 8, id. at 34-35.
11. Id. at 33.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 34.
15. Id.
7
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residence, the issue is moved from one about working conditions to one
about immigration," adding that "[t]he central issue about security
within the labour force is exchanged for the issue of the security of
border controls and foreigners."16 This shift of focus from labor
exploitation to security may also lead to rendering any rights granted to
victims of trafficking under immigration law conditional upon the
perceived "usefulness" of the victim to the state. Under this
functionalist logic, the state has the discretion to provide security of
residence to victims only if the latter prove to be useful in the
prosecution of trafficking cases.
This trend has been prevalent in the European Union, where a
number of EU initiatives related to the position of the victim have been
framed and justified under a functionalist, prosecutorial logic. This
trend is particularly visible in the 2004 Directive on the Residence
Permit to Victims of Trafficking,17 which was adopted with the specific
purpose "to define the conditions for granting residence permits of
limited duration, linked to the length of the relevant national
proceedings, to third-country nationals who cooperate in the fight
against trafficking in human beings or against action to facilitate illegal
immigration" (emphasis added).1s Following this logic, the directive
places a duty on Member States to consider issuing a residence permit
for victims of trafficking if the following conditions are met: the
opportunity presented for the victim to prolong his or her stay on its
territory for the investigations or the judicial proceedings; the
demonstration by the victim of a clear intention to cooperate; and the
victim having severed all relations with those suspected of human
trafficking.' 9 Residence permits may thus be provided to victims only if
they facilitate the prosecution of suspected traffickers. Not only that,
but the residence permit provided is entirely conditional upon the
progress of the criminal proceedings--it will not be renewed if the above
conditions cease to be satisfied or if a decision adopted by the competent
authorities has terminated the relevant proceedings. 20 This approach is
also echoed in the recently adopted Directive on Trafficking in Human
Beings, 21 whose protective provision placing Member States under the
duty to allow their national authorities "not to prosecute or impose
penalties on victims" for their involvement in criminal activities that
they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being
16. ELSPETH GUILD, SECURITY AND MIGRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 174 (2009).
17. Council Directive 2004/81, 2004 O.J. (L 261) 19 (EC).
18. See Article 1, id. at 20.
19. See Article 8, id. at 22.
20. See Article 13(1), id. at 23.
21. Council Directive 2011/36, 2011 0.J. (L 101) 1 (EU).
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subjected to trafficking (Article 8) has also been justified partly under a
prosecutorial logic. 22
2. The Case of Human Smuggling
Similar concerns regarding the consequences of the securitization of
migration for the individual arise from the provisions of the Protocol on
the Smuggling of Migrants. While it is true that criminal liability for
human smuggling does not extend to the smuggled migrants
themselves, with the Protocol expressly stating that migrants will not
become liable to criminal prosecution for the fact of having been the
object of smuggling, 23 the provision on the criminalization of smuggling
expressly states that it does not prevent states from taking measures
against a person whose conduct constitutes an offense under their
domestic law. 24 The Smuggling Protocol thus does not prevent states
from treating illegal entry, stay, or residence as such as criminal
offenses under their domestic law.25 Moreover, the Smuggling Protocol
does not expressly exclude the criminalization of individuals or
organizations that provide assistance to individuals for the purposes of
them accessing or remaining in the territory of states in order to lodge
an application for asylum.
Such criminalization is very likely implicitly excluded by the
requirement in the Protocol for the smuggling offenses to be instituted
only when committed intentionally and in order to obtain financial
gain,26 and, as in the case of the Trafficking Protocol, concerns with
regard to the rights of asylum seekers have led to the inclusion of a
human rights saving clause in the Protocol. 27 However, this may not be
sufficient to limit the consequences stemming from a broad
22. Id. at 7. According to the Preamble to the Directive, "[t]he aim of such protection is
to safeguard the human rights of victims, to avoid further victimisation and to encourage
them to act as witnesses in criminal proceedings against the perpetrators" (emphasis
added). Id. at 3.
23. Id. at 7.
24. Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing
the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 6(4), Nov. 15, 2000, available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/479dee062.html [hereinafter Smuggling Protocol].
25. Id. The recent Italian legislation constitutes a prime example of such
criminalization. However, the use of criminal law sanctions in the context of failing to
leave the country was ruled as contrary to EU law by the Court of Justice of the European
Union in the recent ruling. See Case C-61/11, Corte d'appello di Trento v. El Dridi, O.J. (C
113) (2011).
26. Smuggling Protocol, supra note 24, art. 6(1).
27. Id. art. 19. For background to the negotiations, see Anne Gallagher, Human Rights
and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary
Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 994 (2001).
9
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criminalization approach. This is evident when one examines the
definition and criminalization of human smuggling at the EU level. The
directive defining what is called in EU law the "facilitation of
unauthorized entry, transit and residence"28 goes further than the
Smuggling Protocol in that it does not require one to obtain a financial
or other material benefit for the smuggling offense to be established. 29
The Directive calls upon member states to adopt criminal sanctions for
"any person who intentionally assists a person who is not a national of a
Member State to enter, or transit across, the territory of a Member
State in breach of the laws of the State concerned on the entry or transit
of aliens. ... 30 The scope of criminalization is very broad as it can cover
any form of assistance to enter or transit the territory of an EU Member
State in breach of what is essentially administrative law (such as cases
where the migrant is traveling without travel documents).
The negative impact this provision has on third-country nationals
who wish to apply for asylum and gain access to the European Union is
evident. The directive does attempt to address this issue by granting
Member States the discretion not to impose sanctions for human
smuggling by applying their national law and practice for cases where
the aim of the behavior is to provide humanitarian assistance to the
person concerned. 3' However, this provision is discretionary, so its value
in redressing the balance set out by the broad definition and
criminalization of human smuggling under EU law is questionable. By
using the threat of criminal sanctions, the EU measures on human
smuggling essentially aim at deterring individuals and organizations
from coming into contact and assisting any third-country national
wishing to enter the territory of EU Member States. As has been noted
in an issue paper published by the Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights, "the message which is sent is that contact with
foreigners can be risky as it may result in criminal charges."32
In addition to the criminalization provisions, the protocol includes a
series of provisions on enforcement. A specific part of the protocol is
devoted to smuggling of migrants by sea. 33 This contains detailed
provisions on state cooperation to suppress the smuggling of migrants at
28. Council Directive 2002/90, 2002 O.J. (L 328) 19 (EC).
29. See art. 1(1)(a), id.
30. Id.; accord Council Directive 2002/946, art. 1(1), 2002 O.J. (L 328) 2 (EC) ("Each
Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the infringements defined
in Articles 1 and 2 of Directive 2002/90/EC are punishable by effective, proportionate and
dissuasive criminal penalties which may entail extradition.").
31. See Article 1(2), Council Directive 2002/90, supra note 28.
32. Elspeth Guild, Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Human Rights
Implications, COUNCIL OF EUR., COMM'R HUM. RTs. 39 (2009).
33. Smuggling Protocol, supra note 24, arts. 7-9.
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sea, a number of which have been inspired by similar provisions on
enforcement included in the UN Narcotics Convention.3 4 Of particular
importance is a provision allowing states to board and search vessels
suspected of being engaged in human smuggling and are without
nationality35-with the aim presumably being to cover smaller vessels
carrying migrants such as the cayucos and the pateras.36 This provision
has formed the basis of quite extensive EU rules allowing for extensive
enforcement measures at sea.37 According to the rules for sea border
operations coordinated by the European Border Agency, enforcement
measures (which include both boarding and searching the ship and
seizing the ship and apprehending persons on board) will be taken "if
the suspicions that the ship is without nationality prove to be founded
and that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship is
engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea" in accordance with the
Protocol Against Smuggling.38 Part III of the protocol on "prevention,
cooperation and other measures" includes an extensive set of further
enforcement provisions including provisions on information, on border
measures, on travel documents, and on return. 39 The detail of these
provisions and the focus on enforcement do justice to Hathaway's claim
that the treatment of human smuggling in a convention on organized
crime serves to trigger the globalization of border control, with the
powers and reach of the state being substantially extended.
B. Immigration Control as Counterterrorism
September 11, 2001 has been a watershed moment for the
securitization of immigration control. The immediate U.S. response-
34. See DOUGIAs GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, 184-
85 (2009); MCCLEAN, supra note 3, at 399-414.
35. According to Article 8(7) of the Smuggling Protocol,
[a] State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is
engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea and is without
nationality or may be assimilated to a vessel without nationality may
board and search this vessel. If evidence confirming the suspicion is
found, that State Party shall take appropriate measures in accordance
with relevant domestic and international law.
Smuggling Protocol, supra note 24.
36. Article 3(d) of the Smuggling Protocol defines a "vessel" broadly as "any type of
water craft, including non-displacement craft and seaplanes, used or capable of being used
as a means of transportation on water, except a warship, naval auxiliary or other vessel
owned or operated by a Government and used, for the time being, only on government
non-commercial service." Id.
37. Council Decision 2010/252, 2010 O.J. (L 111) 20 (EU).
38. See annex I, 2.5.2.5., id. at 23.
39. Smuggling Protocol, supra note 24, arts. 10-18.
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which was heavily influenced by the manner in which the 9/11 attacks
occurred-has led to the development of a remarkable transatlantic
convergence regarding border security. The main elements of this
securitized model of immigration control are as follows: immigration
checks and controls do not serve only immigration but also security
purposes-"it is all about security"; there is an emphasis on preventing
movement, and thus a shift from controls at the physical border to
extraterritorial immigration controls aiming to screen those planning to
travel in advance of traveling anywhere in the globe; and this
preventative approach is based on risk assessment and aims to identify
"dangerous" individuals in advance. In this light, there is a shift from
immigration control in a narrow sense to the control of mobility more
broadly: it is not only third-country nationals wishing to enter the
territory who are monitored, but all travelers and passengers. In this
process, there is a widening of surveillance, with a wide range of
personal data being collected for the purposes of securitized
immigration control and a wide range of government agencies (and not
only immigration agencies) having access to such data, as well as a
deepening of surveillance (via the collection of extremely sensitive
categories of personal data, including biometrics). The securitization of
immigration control in this manner has served to strengthen the state
by leading to a proliferation of state power. At the same time, it poses
significant challenges to fundamental rights, in particular
nondiscrimination, privacy, and data protection. By focusing on the
United States and the European Union, the following Sections will cast
light on the emergence of a transatlantic convergence on border security
in a globalized world.
1. Immigration Control and Security in U.S. Law
The manner in which the 9/11 attacks took place signaled an
emphasis on border security, and prompted discussions on the issue of
entry to the United States of those who could execute such attacks. The
9/11 Commission Report devoted a section on "terrorist travel."40 In this
context, the report stressed the shortcomings of the pre-9/11 U.S.
system, asserting that "targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon
against terrorists as targeting their money," and recommended that the
United States "should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations,
and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist
40. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTAcKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 383-85 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
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travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility."41 This approach was
also reflected in the U.S. strategy for "homeland security." The latter,
put forward by the Bush Administration in 2002, included a whole
chapter on "border and transportation security," and another on
information sharing for homeland security. Great emphasis was placed
on the widening and deepening of information collection and sharing
(including of biometrics) from a variety of sources. 42 It is indicative that
the wording of both the chapters on border security and information
sharing converges in this respect. The strategy calls for the
establishment of a "border of the future" (smart borders) 43 and of a
"system of systems" which will provide "the right information to the
right people at all times." 44
This strategy was translated into a series of legislative and
executive measures aiming, on the one hand, at monitoring the
movement of passengers into and through the United States (by the
establishment of prescreening systems) and, on the other, at promoting
interagency cooperation and the interoperability of databases with
regard to "homeland" and "border" security. The latter appears as a
term in the title of the 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
Reform Act, which placed emphasis on another element of "border
security" linked to both aspects described above: the identification of
individuals wishing to enter the United States, in particular, by
introducing requirements that travel documents contain machine-
readable data, such as fingerprints. Subsequent measures expressly
required the taking of biometric identifiers from individuals entering
the United States, emphasizing again the prevention element in border
control.45
The emphasis of U.S. law on preventative immigration control via
the use of biometric identification for third-country nationals is evident
in the US-VISIT program, a key component of the new U.S. system of
41. Id. at 385.
42. OFFICE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
22 (2002).
43. Id. at 22.
44. Id. at 56; see also Reg Whitaker, A Faustian Bargain? America and the Dream of
Total Information Awareness, in THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE AND VISIBILITY 14,
155-68 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson eds., 2006) (discussing the now-aborted
scheme by the Bush Administration for the establishment of a Total Information
Awareness [TIA] system).
45. For a general analysis of "border security" in the U.S. context, see Valsamis
Mitsilegas, Borders, Security and Transatlantic Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century:
Identity and Privacy in an Era of Globalized Surveillance, in IMMIGRATION POLICY AND
SECURITY 148, 148-60 (Terri E. Givens et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Borders, Security and
Transatlantic Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century].
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extraterritorial immigration control aimed at "border security." Entitled
'The U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT) Program," it has been designed to use biometric and biographic
information to control and monitor the preentry, entry, status and exit
of foreign visitors and is deemed to be "intended to enhance the security
of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade,
ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect the
privacy of visitors to the United States."46 As the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) noted, it is "part of a continuum of security
measures that begins overseas, when a person applies for a visa to
travel to the United States, and continues on through entry and exit at
U.S. air and seaports and, eventually, at land border crossings"
(emphasis added).47 The features of US-VISIT were designed to include
reliance on biometrics, integration of arrival and departure data on
foreign nationals (including commercial carrier passenger manifests),
and integration with other law enforcement and security systems.48 The
system initially applied to select nationalities, but, notwithstanding
privacy concerns,49 has now been rolled out for all foreign visitors.50 In
this context, it has been noted
that the US VISIT Program now applies to all foreign
bodies, not merely those that have been identified as
potentially "risky" or even "guilty" . . . is all the more
significant. In the new border protection practices, each
visitor to the US features as a foreign body tagged with
an individual calculated level of risk.51
These concerns are intensified in the light of the development of a new
US-VISIT:
46. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-316, HOMELAND SECURITY:
STRATEGIC SOLUTION FOR US-VISIT PROGRAM NEEDS TO BE BETTER DEFINED, JUSTIFIED
AND COORDINATED 1 (2008) [hereinafter STRATEGIC SOLUTION FOR US-VISIT PROGRAM
NEEDS TO BE BETTER].
47. Colin J. Bennett, What Happens When You Book an Airline Ticket? The Collection
and Processing of Passenger Data Post-9/11, in GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE AND POLICING:
BORDERS, SECURITY, IDENTITY 113, 127 (Elia Zureik & Mark B. Salter eds., 2005).
48. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT PROGRAM, INCREMENT 1: PRIVACY
IMPACT ASSESSMENT (2003).
49. See generally U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-202, HOMELAND
SECURITY: SOME PROGRESS MADE BUT MANY CHALLENGES REMAIN ON U.S. VISITOR AND
IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM (2005).
50. See Mark B. Salter, Passports, Mobility, and Security: How Smart Can the Border
Be?, 5 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 71, 78 (2004).
51. Charlotte Epstein, Embodying Risk: Using Biometrics to Protect the Borders, in
RISK AND THE WAR ON TERROR 178, 185 (Louise Amoore & Marieke de Goede eds., 2008).
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capability known as "Unique Identity," which is to
establish a single identity for all individuals who
interact with any immigration and border management
organisation by capturing the individual's biometrics,
including 10 fingerprints and a digital image, at the
earliest possible interaction (emphasis added). 52
The ambition of U.S. law and policy has been to extend the net of
securitized immigration control globally. Not only has U.S. law required
biometrics from third-country nationals wishing to enter the United
States, but it has moved further to require third states to introduce
biometric identity documents to their citizens if they wished to receive
preferential treatment from the United States as part of the U.S. Visa
Waiver Program. Under the latter, "the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the 'B'
nonimmigrant visa requirement for aliens traveling from certain
countries as temporary visitors for business or pleasure."53 The
biometrics requirement to the existing Visa Waiver Program introduced
by the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 200254
mandated that, by October 26, 2004, the government of each Visa
Waiver Program country needed to certify that it has established a
program to issue to its nationals machine-readable passports that are
tamper-resistant and incorporate a biometric identifier. The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 20045 "added the requirement
that by October 26, 2006, as a condition of being in the VWP [Visa
Waiver Program], each country must certify that it is developing a
program to issue tamper-resistant, machine-readable visa documents
that incorporate biometric identifiers which are verifiable at the
country's port of entry."56
Visa facilitation, on the condition of the deepening of surveillance
via the introduction of biometrics, has thus become a U.S. foreign policy
tool aiming to create a global intensification of surveillance. As will be
seen below, the U.S. requirements have had significant impact on the
development of the EU policy in the field, with the related issue of visa
reciprocity also arising.5 7 At the same time, the collection of biometric
52. STRATEGIC SOLUTION FOR US-VISIT PROGRAM NEEDS TO BE BETTER, supra note 46,
at 2.
53. ALLISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL32221, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM (2004),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32221.pdf.
54. Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002).
55. Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
56. SISKIN, supra note 53, at 19-20.
57. The European Commission reports regularly on visa reciprocity. For the latest
Report at the time of writing, see Report from the Commission to the European Parliament
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data under the Visa Waiver Program has been linked with the
development by the United States of an automated entry-exit system.
The 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act58 mandated that "the
Secretary of [the DHS], in consultation with the Secretary of State ...
develop and implement a[n] . . . electronic travel authorization system"
(ESTA), through which each alien electronically provides, in advance of
travel, the biographical information necessary to determine whether the
alien is eligible to travel to the United States and enter under the VWP.
It also required the Secretary of the DHS "to establish an exit system
that records the departure of every alien who entered under the VWP
and left the United States by air."59 This system is not yet fully in place.
However, according to the DHS:
[o]nce ESTA is mandatory, all nationals or citizens of
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries who plan to
travel to the United States for temporary business or
pleasure will require an approved ESTA prior to
boarding a carrier to travel by air or sea to the United
States under the VWP.60
In addition to requiring biometrics from third-country nationals and
using biometrics as a foreign policy tool to export U.S. requirements at
the global level, the next step towards the intensification of surveillance
has been the U.S. legislature's move to internalize this security
paradigm by introducing a requirement for the inclusion of biometrics in
U.S. passports. According to the State Department, since 2007, only e-
passports are issued-they contain a computer chip with a digital
photograph, in addition to the data visually displayed on the photo page
of the passport.6 ' As Ayelet Shachar has noted writing on U.S.
immigration law, "the increased post 9/11 regulation of the non-citizen
has become a precursor for adopting unprecedented immigration control
measures affecting the quintessential member: the American citizen."62
This is only one of a number of instances where, as will be seen below,
and the Council on Certain Third Countries' Maintenance of Visa Requirements in Breach
of the Principle of Reciprocity, COM (2010) 620 final (May 11, 2010).
58. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-53, 121 Stat. 266, 711 (2007).
59. SISKIN, supra note 53, at 21.
60. Fact Sheet: Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), HOMELAND SEC.
(June 3, 2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1212498415724.shtm.
61. The U.S. Electronic Passport, TRAVEL.STATE.Gov, http://travel.state.gov/passport/
passport_2498.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
62. Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 165, 183 (2007).
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the link between security and the generalized monitoring of movement
has led to the expansion of control from the foreigner to the citizen.
2. Immigration Control and Security in EU Law
The link between immigration control and security was clearly
articulated in the five-year Program for EU Justice and Home Affairs
law and policy agreed by the European Council in 2004 (the Hague
Program). According to the latter,
The management of migration flows, including the fight
against illegal immigration should be strengthened by
establishing a continuum of security measures that
effectively links visa application procedures and entry
and exit procedures at external border crossings. Such
measures are also of importance for the prevention and
control of crime, in particular terrorism. In order to
achieve this, a coherent approach and harmonised
solutions in the EU on biometric identifiers and data are
necessary (emphasis added).63
This is a clear reflection of the concept of "border security" as developed
in the United States, with controls on immigration and movement being
prioritized and linked with counterterrorism. In this manner, the
wording of the Hague Program represents the creation of what scholars
have already identified in the 1990s as the so-called "(in)security
continuum," which consists of linking, in law and policy discourse, the
disparate aims of controlling immigration on the one hand and fighting
"security threats" such as crime and terrorism on the other.64
Intervention before entry, prevention and the collection and exchange of
personal data (including biometrics) are all key in this context.
As with the United States, the renewal of such an (in)security
continuum emerged at the EU level following attacks in Madrid, a
European capital. In the Declaration on Combating Terrorism of March
25, 2004, following these attacks, the European Council linked the
monitoring of the movement of people with counterterrorism by
stressing that "[i]mproved border controls and document security play
an important role in combating terrorism."65 There were two elements
63. The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the
European Union, 2005 O.J. (C 53) 1, 7.
64. See DIDIER BIGO, POLICES EN RtsEAux: L'EXPtRIENCE EUROP9ENNE (1996).
65. Declaration on Combating Terrorism, Brussels European Council 7 (Mar. 25, 2004),
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf.
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in this approach: the inclusion of biometrics in EU visas and passports,
which were to be prioritized and relevant measures adopted by the end
of 2004, and the enhancement of the interoperability between EU
databases and the creation of "synergies" between existing and future
information systems (such as the Schengen Information System II, the
Visa Information System and Eurodac) in order to exploit their added
value within their respective legal and technical frameworks in the
prevention and fight against terrorism.66 Unlike the United States,
where, as seen above, the introduction of biometrics in identity
documents of third-country nationals preceded the introduction of
biometrics in the passports of U.S. citizens, in the European Union
moves to include biometrics were pursued simultaneously under a
banner of security.
Political pressure towards the insertion of biometrics into identity
and travel documents in EU Member States led to the adoption, in
December 2004, of a Regulation introducing biometric identifiers (in the
form of facial images and fingerprints) in EU passports.67 The
Commission justified the introduction of biometrics in EU passports as
being necessary to meet U.S. requirements on document security and
thus prolong the U.S. Visa Waiver Program that a number of EU
Member States enjoy and extend it to EU Member States that are not
members.66 The legal basis of the Regulation was the then Article
62(2)(a) of the EC Treaty on External Border Controls, although the
Regulation was deemed by Member States such as the United Kingdom
to be a security measure.69 The Regulation was finally adopted
notwithstanding serious legality objections related to the
appropriateness of a Title IV (immigration) legal basis in regards to
measures affecting EU citizens and doubts over the existence of
Community competence to adopt binding legislation on the content of
identity documents. 70 Notwithstanding these concerns, negotiations on
the measure went ahead. A second biometric identifier-fingerprints-
was added and the biometrics regulation was adopted swiftly thereafter
66. See Valsamis Mitsilegas, Contr6le des 6trangers, des passagers, des citoyens:
surveillance et anti-terrorisme, 60 CULTURES ET CONFLITS, Hiver [Winter] 2005, at 185
(Fr.), available at http://conflits.revues.org/index1829.html.
67. Council Regulation 2252/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 385) 1 (EC).
68. Mitsilegas, supra note 66, at 172.
69. See Letter from Caroline Flint IMP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Home Office
to Lord Julian Grenfell, Chairman (July 15, 2004), http/www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/1d200506/ldselect/ldeucom/16/16208.htm (stating that "[o]ur view is that the current proposal is
first and foremost a security measure").
70. Mitsilegas, supra note 66.
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in December 2004.71 EU immigration law was thus used to adopt a
measure deemed by some as primarily concerned with security and
applicable not to third-country nationals, but to EU citizens. As I noted
back in 2005, in this manner and under a questionable legal basiS72 EU
Member States unanimously adopted a measure facilitating the
surveillance not of foreigners but of their own citizens.73
Biometrics are also playing a central role in EU immigration
control, in particular via their use in the EU Visa Information System
(VIS).74 The development of the VIS is a clear example of the trend to
securitize migration and blur the boundary between immigration and
police databases. The Council on Justice and Home Affairs adopted
detailed conclusions on the development of VIS in February 2004,
stating clearly that one of the purposes of the system would be to
"contribute towards improving the administration of the common visa
policy and towards internal security and combating terrorism." 75 It also
71. The need for the swift adoption of the proposal has also been justified on the grounds
that the United States would abandon its visa-waiver program with those EU Member
States that had not introduced biometrics in their passports by a certain date. The EU has
managed to obtain an extension to the U.S. deadline for the insertion of biometrics, but this
new U.S. deadline will not be met and it is unlikely to be extended by the United States. See
US Says Deadline for Biometric 'Passports" Cannot be Extended, STATEwATcH,
http://www.statewatch.org/ news/2005/apr/Oeu-us-passports.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012)
(reproducing the March 25, 2005 letter from the Chairman of the U.S. House Judiciary
Committee to the Commission and the Council).
72. It is noteworthy in this context that the Lisbon Treaty, in force since December 1,
2009, now includes an express legal basis that may enable the adoption of EU measures
on "passports, identity cards, residence permits or any other such document."
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 77(3),
Sept. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. Although this power is linked with
the facilitation of free movement and residence rights for EU citizens, Article 77(3) is
included in the part of the Treaty dealing with policies on border checks, immigration, and
asylum. See Chapter 2 of Title V on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, id. at 73.
73. See Mitsilegas, supra note 66. For an articulation of this argument in an English-
language publication, see Valsamis Mitsilegas, Border Security in the European Union:
Towards Centralised Controls and Maximum Surveillance, in WHOSE FREEDOM, SECURITY
AND JUSTICE? 359 (Anneliese Baldaccini et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Border Security in
the European Union].
74. On the use of biometrics in EU databases, with emphasis on the immigration
databases, see Anneliese Baldaccini, Counter-Terrorism and the EU Strategy for Border
Security: Framing Suspects with Biometric Documents and Databases, 10 EUR. J.
MIGRATION & L. 31 (2008). See also Evelien Brouwer, The Use of Biometrics in EU
Databases and Identity Documents: Keeping Track of Foreigners' Movements and Rights,
in ARE YOU WHO YOU SAY You ARE? THE EU AND BIOMETRIC BORDERS 45, 48-50 (Juliet
Lodge ed., 2007).
75. Press Release, Justice and Home Affairs, Council of the European Union, at 16
(Feb. 19, 2004), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eulpress/press-releases/latest-
pressreleases/newsroomrelated.aspx?bid=86&grp=6802&lang-en&id=.
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called for access to VIS to be granted to border guards and "other
national authorities to be authorised by each Member State such as
police departments, immigration departments and services responsible
for internal security."76 In June 2004, the Council adopted a Decision
forming the legal basis for the establishment of VIS 77 and negotiations
began to define its purpose and functions and formulate rules on access
and exchange of data. The Commission subsequently tabled a draft
Regulation aiming to take VIS further by defining its aims and rules on
data access and exchange.78 The Council on Justice and Home Affairs of
24 February 2005 called for access to VIS to be given to national
authorities responsible for "internal security" when exercising their
powers in "investigating, preventing and detecting criminal offences,
including terrorist acts . . . [or] threats" and invited the Commission to
present a separate, third-pillar (national security) proposal to this end.7 9
The Commission tabled such a proposal in November 2005.80 The two
texts were linked and thus negotiated in parallel (codecision was
formally required for the first-pillar regulation, while for the third-pillar
decision the European Parliament had a consultation role).8' Agreement
on both proposals was confirmed at the Council on Justice and Home
Affairs of 12-13 June 2007,82 and they were published in the Official
Journal with considerable delay in August 2008.83 Reflecting the logic of
the Conclusions of the 2005 Council on Justice and Home Affairs, the
VIS Regulation expressly states that one of the purposes of the Visa
Information System is to "contribute to the prevention of threats to
76. Id. at 19.
77. Council Decision 2004/512, 2004 O.J. (L 213) 5 (EC).
78. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the Exchange of Data Between Member
States on Short Stay-Visas, at 2, COM (2004) 835 final (Dec. 28, 2004).
79. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Meeting on Justice and
Home Affairs, at 16 (Feb. 24, 2005), http://www.consilium.europa.euluedocs/cms-datal
docs/pressdatalen/jha/83980.pdf.
80. Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning Access for Consultation of the Visa
Information System (VIS) by the Authorities of Member States Responsible for Internal
Security and by Europol for the Purpose of the Prevention, Detection and Investigation of
Terrorist Offenses and of Other Serious Criminal Offenses, COM (2005) 600 final (Nov. 24,
2005).
81. For details, see Valsamis Mitsilegas, Human Rights, Terrorism and the Quest for
"Border Security", in INDIVIDUAL GUARANTEES IN THE EUROPEAN JUDIcIAL AREA IN
CRIMINAL MATTERS 85 (Marco Pederazzi et al. eds., 2011).
82. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Meeting on Justice and
Home Affairs (June 12-13, 2007).
83. Council Regulation 767/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 218) 60 (EC); Council Decision 2008/633,
2008 O.J. (L 218) 129 (EU).
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internal security of . . . the Member States."84 The Regulation also
contains a bridging clause to the third-pillar decision that gives Europol
access to VIS by Europol "within the limits of its mandate and when
necessary for the performance of its tasks," and gives the relevant
national authorities access to VIS "if there are reasonable grounds to
consider that consultation of VIS data will substantially contribute to
the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences and of
other serious criminal offences."85 The terms of access of internal
security authorities and Europol to the VIS are set out in detail in the
third-pillar decision.86 The VIS will also include biometric data.87 Some
detail with regard to the introduction of biometrics to EU visas can be
found in a recently adopted Regulation amending the Common Consular
Instructions.88 The link between the collection and use of biometrics on
the one hand and the identification of the visa holder on the other is
made clear already in the Preamble to the Regulation.89 In a clear
convergence with the U.S. system, the Regulation calls upon Member
States to collect biometric identifiers comprising the facial image and
ten fingerprints from the applicant.90
Another example of the new generalized surveillance based on
monitoring movement, applying to both EU and third-country nationals,
is the collection of sensitive personal data. The new move by the
European Commission to propose the creation of an entry-exit system at
the external borders of the European Union, coupled with facilitation of
border crossings for bona fide travelers and the creation of an electronic
travel authorization system.9' The entry-exit system would be a new
database, applying to third-country nationals admitted for a short stay;
bona fide travelers would be "low risk" third-country nationals, but also
EU citizens-both would cross external borders via "automated gates."
The Electronic Travel Authorization System (ETAS) would apply to
third-country nationals not subject to a visa requirement who would be
required to make an electronic application in advance of traveling.
84. The Regulation also enables the recording of biometric data into VIS in Article 5(1).
Council Regulation 767/2008, supra note 83, at 64-65.
85. Id. at 63.
86. In particular, see Articles 5-7, id. at 64-65.
87. Id. at 61, 64-66.
88. See Regulation 390/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 131) 1, 1 (EC).
89. "The integration of biometric identifiers in the VIS is an important step towards
the use of new elements, which establish a more reliable link between the visa holder and
the passport in order to avoid the use of false identities." Id.
90. Id. at 4. For exceptions, see id. at 5.
91. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, at 5,
COM (2008) 69 final (Feb. 13, 2008).
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These proposals are similar to the U.S. model of border security, and are
reminiscent of the recommendation by the 9/11 Commission to "balance"
the collection of biometrics of U.S. citizens with measures aimed at
speeding "known travelers." Both interoperability and the use of
biometrics are central to these proposals, in particular to the proposals
for the establishment of a system of border crossings via automated
gates. The Commission notes that:
In the run-up to full introduction of biometric passports,
the current legal framework allows for schemes based on
voluntary enrolment to be deployed by Member States,
under the condition that the criteria for enrolment
correspond to those for minimum checks at the borders
and that the schemes are open for all persons enjoying
the Community right to free movement. Such schemes
should be interoperable within the EU, based on common
technical standards, which should be defined to support
the widespread and coherent use of automated border
control systems (emphasis added).92
However, the added value of a new database on an entry-exit system for
third-country nationals is not evident, especially in light of the recent
establishment of the VIS. Moreover and along with the evident
proportionality concerns, there have been serious legality concerns with
regard to the extension of legislation on the management of the EU
external border to EU citizens.93 However, the momentum for the
establishment of an entry-exit system along these lines is currently
high. The European Council invited the Commission to present
proposals for an entry-exit and registered traveler system by the
beginning of 2010,94 and agreed in the European Pact on Immigration
and Asylum (endorsed by the European Council in October 2008) to
deploy "modern technological means to ensure that systems are
interoperable" and stated that from 2012 the focus should be "on
establishing electronic recording of entry and exit, together with a fast-
track procedure for European citizens and other travellers."95 The
92. Id. at 7.
93. For further details on this point, see Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Borders Paradox:
The Surveillance of Movement in a Union Without Internal Frontiers, in A RIGHT TO
INCLUSION AND ExcLUSION? NORMATIVE FAULT LINES OF THE EU's AREA OF FREEDOM,
SECURITY AND JUSTICE 33 (Hans Lindah1 ed., 2009) [hereinafter The Borders Paradox].
94. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 1 10 (June 20, 2008).
95. Memorandum, European Pact on Immigration and Asylum to the Council of the
EU, pt. 3(e), at 10 (Sep. 24, 2008).
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political prioritization of the establishment of an entry-exit system has
been reaffirmed in the Stockholm Program, the five-year plan
succeeding the Hague Program, which emphasized once more the link
between security, mobility, and technology. 96
The opening sentence of the Stockholm Program chapter entitled
"access to Europe in a globalised world" states that "[t]he Union must
continue to facilitate legal access to the territory of its Member States
while in parallel taking measures to counteract illegal immigration and
cross-border crime and maintaining a high level of security" (emphasis
added).97 Noting that the possibilities of "new and interoperable
technologies hold great potential for rendering border management
more efficient as well as more secure but should not lead to
discrimination or unequal treatment of passengers," the European
Council invited the Commission to present proposals for an entry-exit
system alongside a fast track registered traveler program with a view to
such a system becoming operational as soon as possible; to prepare a
study on the possibility and usefulness of developing a European system
of travel authorization and, where appropriate, to make the necessary
proposals; and to continue to examine the issue of automated border
controls and other issues connected to rendering border management
more efficient.98 The Commission Action Plan on the implementation of
the Stockholm Program envisaged the tabling of legislative proposals
setting up an Entry Exit System and a Registered Traveller Program in
2011.99 No such proposals have been tabled yet at the time of writing,
but the development of EU border control along these lines is clearly a
live issue.100
By establishing an entry-exit system-which is remarkably similar
to developments in U.S. law analyzed above-the EU introduces a
system of surveillance of movement based on automaticity,
interoperability, and the collection and consultation of sensitive
personal data, such as biometrics. As I have noted elsewhere, merging
the logic of risk prevention with the logic of border security, this model
has far-reaching consequences for the protection of fundamental rights
96. The Stockholm Programme, 2010 O.J. (C 115) 1, 1 (EC).
97. Id. at 26.
98. Id. at 27.
99. Delivering an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for Europe's Citizens: Action
Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, at 44, COM (2010) 171 final (Apr. 20,
2010).
100. A document setting out the provisional agendas for Council meetings during the
Polish Presidency (second semester of 2011) indicates the possibility of the Commission
tabling a (nonlegally binding) Communication on Smart Borders (Entry-Exit System and
Registered Traveller System) during the Presidency. See Memorandum, Provisional
Agendas for Council Meetings, at 30 (June 30, 2011).
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and the relationship between the individual and the state. 01 Movement
is monitored on the basis of profiling and individual, subjective
assessments of each traveler. Both third-country nationals and EU
citizens can be deemed "suspects" under these assessments, and their
freedom of movement curtailed accordingly. The introduction of the
concept of "bona fide" traveler is extremely worrying in this context. As
the European Data Protection Supervisor has noted in his preliminary
comments on the Commission proposals:
The underlying assumption in the communications
(especially in the entry/exit proposal) is worrying: all
travellers are put under surveillance and are considered
a priori as potential law breakers. For instance in the
Registered Travellers system, only the travellers taking
specific steps, through ad hoc registration and provision
of detailed personal information, will be considered
"bona fide" travellers. The vast amount of travellers,
who do not travel frequently enough to undergo such a
registration, are thus, by implication, de facto in the
"mala fide" category of those suspected of intentions of
overstay.102
II. GLOBALIZATION, IMMIGRATION CONTROL, AND DELEGATION
Another way by which state power has proliferated in an era of
globalized immigration control has been via the delegation of powers
and tasks related to such control. This article has already mentioned
how the securitization of immigration control has been promoted via the
reliance of the state on technology (via the creation and interconnection
of a series of databases establishing wide-ranging systems of
surveillance of movement). This Section will expand on the recourse of
the state to technology as a way of delegating power. It will also focus on
two other forms of delegation that are relevant to globalized
immigration control: the establishment and use of government agencies
to control movement, especially in the context of securitized
immigration control; and the recourse of the state to the private sector
to assist with monitoring global flows of people. In terms of the use of
agencies, the (in)security continuum linking immigration and security
has been expressed via border control powers being assigned to security
101. See The Borders Paradox, supra note 93.
102. Preliminary Comments of the European Data Protection Supervisor, at 5-6 (Mar. 3,
2008), available at http://www.edps.europa.eulEDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/
Consultation/Comments/2008/08-03-03_Comments border packageEN.pdf.
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agencies (as in the case of the United States) or immigration agencies
being entrusted with security responsibilities (as in the case of the
European Union and the European Borders Agency-FRONTEX). There
is further transatlantic convergence in enabling maximum interagency
cooperation between immigration agencies and other law enforcement
agencies. In terms of the privatization of immigration control, the
transatlantic convergence on the use of the private sector (especially
carriers) to cooperate with the state has also now been translated, to
some extent, in global instruments such as the Palermo Convention.
This Section will analyze this three-pronged delegation process in
greater detail and attempt to highlight how such delegation expands the
powers of the state while at the same time creates gaps in state
responsibility and accountability for immigration control.
A. The Privatization of Immigration Control
In one of his many important writings on globalization, Fred Aman
explains that the trend toward privatization now involves services, not
regulation, and private parties now perform the functions involved: "[I]n
effect, the government delegates responsibility for services to private
actors."103 This statement is increasingly applicable in the field of
immigration law. Issues surrounding delegation from the state to the
private sector in the context of carriers' liability have been analyzed
extensively in the literature,104 but also arise in the context of the
extension of the privatization of immigration control to include actors
such as employers. This Section will examine both of these instances of
privatization and attempt to demonstrate that, rather than asking the
private sector to replace state functions in the field, privatization in the
field of immigration control means that the state delegates additional
tasks (such as the examination and assessment of identity documents)
to the private sector. In this manner, the involvement of the private
sector serves to add an extra layer of immigration control, on top of the
exercise of the expanding state powers in the field.
103. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New
Administrative Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 128-29 (2003).
104. See, e.g., Virginie Guiraudon, De-Nationalizing Control: Analyzing State Responses
to Constraints on Migration Control, in CONTROLLING A NEW MIGRATION WORLD 29
(Virginie Guiraudon & Christian Joppke eds., 2001). See, e.g., Gallya Lahav, Immigration
and the State: The Devolution and Privatisation of Immigration Control in the EU, 24 J.
ETHNIC MIGRATION STUD. 675 (1998); Frances Nicholson, Implementation of the
Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act 1987: Privatising Immigration Functions at the
Expenses of International Obligations?, 46 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 586 (1997) (providing U.K.
context).
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There has been a long tradition in Europe of using carriers as an
extra layer of immigration control. Both the United Kingdom and the
Schengen countries introduced carriers' liability legislation in the late
1980s, with the Schengen carriers' liability requirements incorporated
in an expanded version in EU law in 2001.105 The Carriers liability
Directive106 takes forward the provisions of Article 26 of the Schengen
Implementing Convention and imposes two main duties on carriers: "to
take all the necessary measures to ensure that an alien carried out by
air or sea is in possession of the travel documents required for entry into
the territories" 107 and to assume responsibility for third-country
nationals who have'been refused entry into the territory, including their
return or assuming the cost of their return. 08 If carriers transport
third-country nationals 'who do not possess the necessary travel
documents, they face a series of financial sanctions. 09 In this manner,
carriers are asked to provide an extra layer of immigration control in
identifying passengers and checking travel documents. EU law also
privatizes immigration control at the level of enforcement, by requiring
carriers to take charge or bear the cost of the return of third-country
nationals whom they have transported into EU territory.
The privatization of immigration control via the imposition of duties
on carriers has expanded the scope of the duties, as well as the global
reach of those duties. As will be seen in detail later in the Article,
carriers are now further required to collect and transmit passenger data
to state authorities."10 As far as the global reach of privatization, it is
noteworthy that both the trafficking and smuggling Protocols of the
Palermo Convention include specific provisions on carriers' liability.
According to the provisions on border measures, parties must "adopt
legislative or other appropriate measures to prevent, to the extent
possible, means of transport operated by commercial carriers from being
used in the commission of' human smuggling or trafficking.
[W]here appropriate, and without prejudice to applicable
international conventions such measures shall include
establishing the obligation of commercial carriers,
105. See Nicholson, supra note 104 (discussing the United Kingdom); MITSILEGAS ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 109-11.
106. Council Directive 2001/51, 2001 O.J. (L 187) 45, 45 (EC).
107. Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, art. 26(1)(b), 1990 O.J. (L 239)
19.
108. See Council Directive 2001/51, supra note 106, at 46; Convention Implementing the
Schengen Agreement, supra note 107, art. 26(l)(a).
109. See Council Directive 2001/51, supra note 106, art. 4-5; Convention Implementing
the Schengen Agreement, supra note 107, art. 26(2).
110. See infra Part V.
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including any transportation company or the owner or
operator of any means of transport, to ascertain that all
passengers are in possession of the travel documents
required for entry into the receiving State."'
The Protocols call for the imposition of sanctions in cases of the
carriers' violation of the duty to ascertain whether passengers are in
possession of the required travel documents.112 They also call upon
states to consider taking measures that permit the denial of entry or
revocation of visas of persons implicated in the commission of trafficking
or smuggling.113 Prevention of movement is thus key to the carriers'
provisions of the Palermo Protocols, with the latter focusing expressly
on carriers' duties to check passengers in order to ascertain the validity
of their travel documents (with the implicit consequence that not
possessing the required travel documents will result in not being
accepted for travel by the carrier).
The preventative aspect of the privatization of immigration control
via the imposition of duties on carriers has been increasingly coupled
with calls upon the private sector to cooperate with the state regarding
the enforcement of immigration law within the territory. This ex post
immigration control, occurring after the entry into the territory, is
evident in the case of imposition of duties on private companies in their
capacity as employers. The latter are increasingly required to assist
immigration control by checking the validity of the documents of those
to be employed in their organization. Involving employers in
immigration control has been a common policy on both sides of the
Atlantic. In the United States, the E-Verify System allows employers to
check, on a voluntary basis, work eligibility by verifying workers' names
and identity data against federal databases.114 E-Verify was launched in
2007,115 following successive pilot projects implementing the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.n16 The
111. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/55/383, at art. 11 (Nov. 15, 2000); Protocol Against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 11, G.A. Res. 25, annex II, U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (Nov. 15, 2000).
112. See Articles 11(4), contained in both Protocols, id.
113. See Articles 11(5), id.
114. Marc R. Rosenblum, E-Verify: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Proposals for Reform,
2011 MIGRATION POLIcY INST. 1.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (2003).
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system is widely applied but has been criticized "for high error rates and
other adverse effects, and some have argued that to be effective it
should be linked to a new biometric identity system."117 The
privatization of immigration control may thus lead to the widening and
deepening of surveillance of both third-country nationals and U.S.
citizens. Marc Rosenblum has noted that "[i]mplementing a national
biometric ID system would require the US government to capture
fingerprints (or some other biometric data) for 160 million US workers,"
adding that "[p]erhaps the most important question about a biometric
card is whether Americans are ready to be fingerprinted as a
precondition for eligibility to work."18
A less generalized but more far-reaching system as to the duties
imposed and their enforcement has been established at the EU level.
The recently adopted Directive on employers' sanctions 19 prohibits the
employment of third-country nationals staying illegally.120 Sanctions for
the infringement of this prohibition are mainly financial,121 but there
are also alternatives, such as exclusion from public procurement.122 The
Directive also provides for the imposition of criminal penalties to
employers if a series of aggravating circumstances occur.123 The
Directive imposes a series of identification, record-keeping, and
reporting- duties on employers. Employers must require that before
taking up the employment a third-country national hold and present to
the employer a valid residence permit or other authorization for his or
her stay; "keep for at least the duration of the employment a copy or
record of the residence permit or other authori[z]ation for stay available
for possible inspection by the competent authorities of the Member
States"; and "notify the competent authorities designated by Member
States of the start of [the] employment of third-country nationals within
a period laid down by each Member State."124 If employers fulfill these
obligations, they will not be held liable for an infringement of the
prohibition of illegal employment unless the employers knew that the
document was presented as a valid residence permit or another
authorization for stay was a forgery.125 EU law thus imposes extensive
immigration enforcement duties on employers, including duties of
cooperation with the state.
117. Rosenblum, supra note 114, at 1-2.
118. Id. at 13.
119. Council Directive 2009/52, 2009 O.J. (L 168) 24 (EC).
120. See Article 3(1), id. at 28.
121. See Articles 5-6, id. at 28-29.
122. See Article 7, id. at 29.
123. See Articles 9-10, id. at 30.
124. See Article 4(1), id. at 28.
125. See Article 4(3), id. at 28.
IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
In addition to the extension of state power by imposing immigration
control duties to the private sector, privatization enhances state power
via the involvement of the private sector in developing state capabilities
on immigration control. As has been noted by Gina Clayton, private
companies are now increasingly involved in the process of issuing U.K.
visas, with the line between private and state responsibility being at
times difficult to draw. 126 In an era where immigration control is
increasingly based on the use of technology, databases, and biometrics,
private commercial interests are inextricably linked with state
interests, with private companies involved in building new databases,
automated gates, and biometric capabilities.127 In this context, the state
may rely on new policies in the field to boost economic activity, while
commercially driven initiatives may be adopted as government policy
without adequate scrutiny or justification.128 The confluence of
commercial and state interests in this context may lead to the
depoliticization of immigration control, with the development of
additional state capabilities in the field being viewed narrowly as a
factor of economic growth or as a consequence of technological
developments. 129
Similar to the criminalization of the facilitation of unauthorized
entry (or human smuggling) discussed above, the private sector is thus
urged to pay particular attention when coming into contact with
foreigners-even if such contact is in the normal course of ordinary
commercial life. In addition to the prohibition and criminalization of
contact with undesired foreigners, the privatization of immigration
control signifies the imposition of specific duties on the private sector, in
particular duties to identify passengers and check the validity of
identity documents. The private sector is held responsible for dealing
with individuals deemed not to be eligible under immigration law and is
under a duty to detect such ineligibility and report it to the state. This
126. See Gina Clayton, The UK and Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Entry
Clearance and Juxtaposed Control, in EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL: LEGAL
CHALLENGES (Valsamis Mitsilegas & Bernard Ryan eds., 2010).
127. For the discussion of the issue of privatization in the development of the U.S.
Homeland Security Strategy, see PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY
PRIVATISATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN
Do ABOUT IT (2007).
128. See generally Valsamis Mitsilegas, Extraterritorial Immigration Control in the 21st
Century: The Individual and the State Transformed, in EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION
CONTROL: LEGAL CHALLENGES 39, supra note 126 [hereinafter Extraterritorial
Immigration Control in the 21st Century] (discussing the changes and growing
securitization in extraterritorial immigration control exercised in the West post-9/11 and
its consequences).
129. On the link between immigration control and technology see, infra Part III.C.
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"responsibilization" strategy 30 mirrors the strategy to involve the
private sector in cooperating with the state in the field of crime control
and security governance.' 3 ' In the field of immigration control,
responsibilization via privatization leads to the strengthening of the
state by introducing additional layers of checks on third-country
nationals.
While extending immigration control and enhancing state power,
the responsibilization of the private sector weakens the position of the
affected individuals in a number of ways: (1) it challenges the right to
asylum and the respect for the principle of nonrefoulement by
potentially preventing the individual's access to the territory for the
purposes of lodging an asylum claim; (2) it challenges the principle of
nondiscrimination by requiring the private sector to evaluate third-
country nationals on the basis of risk assessment; and (3) as seen above
in the Section on the collection of biometrics and as will be seen further
below in the part on the requirements for the transmission of Passenger
Name Data, it challenges the right to private life and data protection
via the collection and transmission to the state of a wide range of
personal data. The latter two challenges become more acute in light of
the extension of checks from third-country nationals to citizens. The
human rights challenges also become rule of law challenges as
responsibilization in the form of the privatization of immigration control
may lead to gaps in the legal responsibility of the state for preventing
access and infringing fundamental rights, as the state can hide behind
the acts of the private sector. These rule of law challenges will be
explored further below.
B. Immigration Control via Delegation to Agencies
Another example of delegation of state power in the field of
immigration control is the establishment of new and extension of the
mandate of existing agencies. In both the European Union and the
United States, the focus on the role of agencies has been highly symbolic
politically and justified on the grounds of the need to provide better
130. See generally David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime
Control in Contemporary Society, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445 (1996) (introducing the
term "responsibilization").
131. For an analysis of privatization in this context, see VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS, MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNTER-MEASURES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A NEW PARADIGM OF
SECURITY GOVERNANCE VERSUS FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES (2003).
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coordination to state practices of border control.13 2 Transatlantic
convergence of law and practice has seen the establishment of new
agencies, the extension of agency powers-in line with the securitization
of immigration control discussed above-to cover not only immigration
control stricto sensu, but also security matters, the prioritization of
interagency cooperation (in particular cooperation between immigration
control agencies and security agencies) and the establishment of
transatlantic cooperation channels between these agencies. As with the
privatization of immigration control, delegation of power to agencies has
potentially significant fundamental rights and rule of law implications.
In the United States, delegation of immigration control to agencies
has become particularly prominent post-9/11, where U.S. law and policy
in the field was marked by a shift from immigration control to border
security more broadly. With border security becoming a central element
of the post-9/11 national security strategy, specific divisions within the
DHS have been allocated a number of responsibilities for various
aspects of immigration control.133 A recent book by a policy expert on
U.S. counterterrorism and border security enumerates no less than
thirty-five agencies with roles in "securing human mobility."134 These
are split between the White House and four other government
departments: the DHS, the State Department, the Department of
Justice, and the Department of Defense. The proliferation of agencies
dealing with immigration control-and beyond that, "human mobility"
(see below)-is clearly illustrated when one looks at the relevant
agencies within the DHS: along with the DHS senior leadership,
responsibility lies, inter alia, with Offices of Intelligence and Analysis,
Policy, U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
Program (US-VISIT), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Transportation
Security Administration.135 This architecture clearly represents an
extension of state power as well as a strongly securitized approach to
immigration control.
In the European Union, efforts to address the impact of
globalization and the geopolitical and legal changes in Europe resulting
132. See generally HOUSE OF LORDS EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, FRONTEX: THE EU
EXTERNAL BORDERS AGENCY, 9TH REPORT, HL PAPER 60 (SESSION 2007-08); Border
Security in the European Union, supra note 72; 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 40.
133. On the development of the DHS in the context of border security, see Borders,
Security and Transatlantic Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 45.
134. SUSAN GINSBURG, SECURING HUMAN MOBILITY IN THE AGE OF RISK: NEW
CHALLENGES FOR TRAVEL, MIGRATION AND BORDERS (2010).
135. Id. at 124.
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in the abolition of internal border controls within the European Union,
on the one hand, and the extension of EU territory via the successive
enlargements of the European Union (in particular the eastward
enlargements) on the other, have led to the establishment of a European
agency responsible for border controls (FRONTEX). 36 The latter has
been established as a Community Agency with specific responsibilities
for border management. 37 Creating a border management agency at the
EU level has posed a number of significant challenges for the
reconfiguration of immigration control in Europe. First of all, the
discussion of delegation of powers from the state to agencies must be
viewed in the specific light of EU law, where the additional layer of the
contested relationship between the competence of the European Union
(and its agencies) and the Member States exists. This aspect is
particularly relevant in the field of immigration control, traditionally
linked to state sovereignty. In this context, a key question as regards
the delegation of immigration control powers at the EU level is who has
the power, and thus the legal responsibility, for immigration control: is
it the Member States of the European Union, or the EU Agency
(FRONTEX)? As will be demonstrated below, the lines between national
and European Union competence in the field are blurred on many
occasions, resulting in gaps in the legal protection of those affected by
immigration control at the EU level.
The difficult task of establishing a European agency for immigration
control, while respecting state sovereignty in the field, is reflected in the
careful articulation of the FRONTEX's powers. The opening article to
the FRONTEX Regulation states that the aim of the Agency is to
improve "the integrated management of the external borders of the
Member States of the European Union."138 While the responsibility for
the control and surveillance of external borders lies with Member
States, the provision continues, the Agency will facilitate and render
more effective the application of European Community measures by
coordinating Member States' implementation of these measures,
thereby contributing to "an efficient, high and uniform level of control
on persons and surveillance of the external borders of the Member
States." 39 To achieve this, the main tasks of the Agency are to
coordinate operational cooperation between Member States, including
136. For the background to the establishment of FRONTEX, see Border Security in the
European Union, supra note 73.
137. Council Regulation 2007/2004, Establishing a European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of
the European Union, 2004 O.J. (L 349) 1 (EC).
138. See Article 1, id. at 3.
139. Id.
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the evaluation, approval, and coordination of proposals for joint
operations and pilot projects and launching, in agreement with Member
States concerned, of initiatives for such operations and projects; 140 to
assist Member States with training of border guards;141 to carry out risk
analysis by developing a common risk analysis model;142 to follow up
research development on border control;143 to assist Member States in
circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance
at external borders;144 and to provide Member States with the necessary
support in organizing joint return operations. 14 5
The key to the question of the extent to which FRONTEX has
replaced national border controls is to determine the extent of the
Agency's coordination powers.146 Two main questions arise in this
context: first, whether Agency staff will have enforcement powers in the
territory of Member States (and consequently which rules will apply to
them); and second, whether the Agency has coercive powers over
Member States when organizing joint operations. As to the first
question, Article 10 of the FRONTEX Regulation states that the
"exercise of executive powers by the agency's staff and the Member
States' experts acting on the territory of another Member State shall be
subject to the national law of that Member State."147 What constitutes
"executive power" in this context is not defined in the regulation. The
latter however avoids explicitly excluding operational powers of Agency
staff from its scope, a view that is reinforced by the similar treatment of
Agency staff with experts from Member States. There is less ambiguity
with regard to the second question-i.e., whether the Agency can compel
Member States to participate in joint operations without their
agreement. Article 3(1) states that "the Agency may itself, and in
agreement with the Member State(s) concerned, launch initiatives for
140. See Articles 2(1) and 3(1), id. at 4.
141. See Articles 2(1) and 5, id. In this context, developments such as the Community
Borders Code are particularly relevant. Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 1.
142. Council Regulation 2007/2004, supra note 137, at 4.
143. See Articles 2(1)(d) and 6, id.
144. Id. Article 8(b) specifically calls for the deployment of the Agency's experts to
support national authorities. Id. at 5.
145. See Articles 2(1)(f) and 9, id. at 4, 5.
146. The preamble further confirms that the development of policy and legislation on
external border control and surveillance remains a responsibility of the EU institutions, in
particular the Council. Id. at 2.
147. Id. at 5. It is noteworthy and indicative of the sensitivity of the issue that in his
evidence before the House of Lords EU Committee on the role of the Agency on returns of
irregular immigrants, the Director, Mr. Laitinen, stated that they "do not have executive
powers." See House of Lords E.U. Select Comm., Illegal Migrants: Proposals for a Common
EU Returns Policy, 32d Report, Sess. 2005-06, HL Paper 166 (2006).
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joint operations and pilot projects . . . ." (emphasis added).148 Thus,
Member States cannot be made to participate in joint projects without
their agreement. Article 20(3) of the Regulation provides an additional
safeguard by stating that proposals for decisions on specific activities to
be carried out at, or in the immediate vicinity of, the external border of
any particular Member State require a vote by the Member of the
Management Board representing that Member State in favor of their
adoption.
The powers of FRONTEX were further developed via the
amendment of its legal basis to allow for the deployment of so-called
Rapid Border Intervention Teams Regulation (RABITs).149 There is a
greater pooling of state sovereignty and a greater clarity and detail as to
the tasks of these teams, which are deployed for the purposes of
providing rapid operational assistance for a limited period to a
requesting EU Member State facing a situation of urgent and
exceptional pressure. 50 The tasks and powers of these teams, the first of
which was deployed at the request of Greece in the autumn of 2010 on
the Greek-Turkish land border,' 5 ' are described in Article 6 of the
RABITs Regulation. This article states that "Members of the teams
shall have the capacity to perform all tasks and exercise all powers for
border checks or border surveillance" in accordance with the Schengen
Borders Code and "that are necessary for the realisation of the
objectives of that Regulation."152 Article 6 also states that they may only
perform tasks and exercise powers under instructions from and, as a
general rule in the presence of border guards of the host Member
State. 53 The RABITs Regulation further contributes to the
militarization of the EU external border, as they are allowed to carry
weapons 54 and use force, including weapons.155 According to the
148. Council Regulation 2007/2004, supra note 137, at 4.'
149. Regulation (EC) No. 863/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 30 (establishing a mechanism for
the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation
2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest
officers).
150. Id.
151. See General Report: European Agency for the Mgmt. of Operational Cooperation at
the External Borders of the Member States of the E.U., FRONTEX, at 40(2011).
152. Regulation (EC) No. 863/2007, supra note 149, at 33.
153. Id.
154. According to Article 6(5) of the RABITs Regulation,
[w]hile performing their tasks and exercising their powers, members of
the teams may carry service weapons, ammunition and equipment as
authorised .according to the home Member State's national law.
However, the host Member State may prohibit the carrying of certain
service weapons, ammunition and equipment, provided that its own
legislation applies the same prohibition to its own border guards.
Id.
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provision on applicable law, while performing the tasks and exercising
the powers, the members of the teams shall comply with EC law and the
national law of the host Member State. 56
The RABITs Regulation has added detail on the legal framework of
some aspects of FRONTEX operations,157 and represents a clear shift
from purely national to EU border control involving executive measures
and coercive powers. However, the legal framework of FRONTEX still
creates a number of concerns with regard to gaps in the accountability
and legal responsibility of the Agency. Delegation of immigration control
to an EU agency increases enforcement powers by providing an
additional layer of immigration control and the Agency's actions may
have significant consequences for the individuals affected, with
FRONTEX already actively coordinating Member State action in the
field. 58 However, the extent of the powers and accountability of the
agency are unclear. FRONTEX has been established as a management
agency, and its annual reports are dominated by management-speak
and management-style targets. This may lead to a depoliticization of
border controls at the EU level, as well as fundamental decisions on EU
border strategy being made on the basis of the FRONTEX operational
plan and the decisions of its management board rather than on the
basis of a more open debate.159 Thus far, decisions on FRONTEX
operations have been shrouded in secrecy, 60 with transparency as to its
operational plans lacking.' 6' Moreover, while its parent regulation has
155. According to Article 6(6),
[w]hile performing their tasks and exercising their powers, members of
the teams shall be authorised to use force, including service weapons,
ammunition and equipment, with the consent of the home Member
State and the host Member Sate, in the presence of border guards of
the host Member State and in accordance with the national law of the
host Member State.
Id. However, Article 6(7) allows the use of weapons, ammunition, and equipment "in
legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of members of the teams or of other
persons, in accordance with the national law of the host Member State." Id.
156. See Article 9, id. at 34.
157. As has the 2010 Decision on the surveillance of the sea external borders, discussed
in part, see Council Decision 2010/252, supra note 37, at 20.
158. For details of FRONTEX planning and coordinating of joint border control
operations contained in its annual reports, see Annual Reports, FRONTEX,
www.frontex.europa.edulannual-report (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
159. For more on FRONTEX and depoliticization, see Border Security in the European
Union, supra note 73.
160. See Violeta Moreno-Lax, Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a
Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States' Obligations Accruing at Sea, 23 INT'L. J.
REFUGEE L. 174, 184 (2011).
161. The recent amendment to the FRONTEX Regulation calls for the drawing up of an
operational plan by the Executive Director of FRONTEX for the joint operations organized
by the Agency. See Regulation (EU) No. 1168/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 7.
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emphasized coordination as a key FRONTEX task, it is not clear
whether such coordination of national responses leads to FRONTEX
responsibility. FRONTEX is officially a "management" agency but
cannot easily fit in with the various typologies of EU agencies 162 that
have been established primarily in a market regulation context. 163 The
emphasis on management in the FRONTEX Regulation cannot mask
the fact that FRONTEX is essentially an operational agency, involved in
actions with a significant impact on the relationship between the
individual and the state.164
Notwithstanding the growth in FRONTEX activities in recent years,
it has been increasingly difficult to pin down its responsibilities when it
comes to its action. FRONTEX may be operational in practice, yet it
may also claim that it has no legal responsibility for border controls, as
it has merely a "coordinating" role. This may lead to a situation in
which FRONTEX denies any responsibility claiming that the exercise of
border controls are for Member States,165 while Member States frame
controls at their external borders as controls by FRONTEX-with
Member States increasingly viewing FRONTEX as an answer to their
expectations with regard to their border control responsibilities.1 66 The
potential for the creation of gaps in the legal responsibility of actors in
FRONTEX operations is magnified if one looks at the legal framework
underpinning the relations between FRONTEX on the one hand and
other bodies and agencies (in particular law enforcement agencies) and
162. For attempts at categorization of EU agencies, see Edoardo Chiti, The Emergence of
a Community Administration: The Case of European Agencies, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
309 (2000); Alexander Kreher, Agencies in the European Community: A Step Towards
Administrative Integration in Europe, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 225 (1997); Ellen Vos,
Reforming the European Commission: What Role to Play for EU Agencies?, 37 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1113 (2000).
163. See Giandominico Majone, The New European Agencies: Regulation by Information,
J. EuR. PUB. POL'Y 262 (1997) (arguing that networking between agencies can help
enhance their reputation and independence, increasing the development of information-
based modes of regulation).
164. See Extraterritorial Immigration Control, supra note 128. As Curtin notes, it can be
argued that in the case of FRONTEX the Council did not delegate its own existing
executive powers but rather the tasks in question had been exercised by Member States.
DEIDRE CURTIN, EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LAW, PRACTICES, AND THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION 164 (2009).
165. See, in this context, the striking FRONTEX news release in which FRONTEX
"would like to state categorically that the agency has not been involved in diversion
activities to Libya," the latter being based on a bilateral agreement between Italy and
Libya. Commissioner Malmstrom visits Frontex, FRONTEX (Feb. 18, 2010),
http://www.frontex.europa.eulnewsroom/newsreleases/art70.htm.
166. Area of Justice, Freedom, and Security, HELLENIc REPUB. MIN. FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 3,
2012), http://wwwl.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/greece-in-the-eu/area-of-justice-freedom-and-
security.html?page=4.
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third countries on the other. The FRONTEX Regulation provides for
cooperation between the Agency and international organizations
(including Europol) and third countries on the basis of "working
arrangements."167 FRONTEX has already entered into a number of such
"working arrangements" with security and law enforcement agencies
both within168 and outside the European Union,169 as well as with a
number of third states.170 The ambiguity regarding the legal force of
working arrangements and the lack of transparency with regard to their
negotiation and content may lead to the emergence of FRONTEX as an
actor in a securitized, global system of immigration control without
being accompanied by clearly defined standards of legal responsibility,
either for itself or for its interlocutors. The implications of these lacunae
in legal responsibility will be further explored in the section on
extraterritorial immigration control below.' 71
C. Immigration Control and Technology
The growing recourse to technology for border controls has been
discussed in this Article in the section on the securitization of
immigration control. The latter is based largely on the establishment
and development of databases, the collection and checking of biometrics,
and the use of automated gates in entry and exit points. The state has
relied on technology in developing further layers of control and
surveillance of individuals on the move. However, this recourse to
technology has significant consequences for the affected individuals. It
leads to the dehumanization of individuals via the instrumentalization
of the human body, with sensitive pieces of personal data being provided
to the state and checked on a regular basis at various instances of
167. See Articles 13-14, Council Regulation 2007/2004, supra note 137, at 5-6.
168. See EUROPOL & FRONTEX, Strategic Co-operation Agreement Between the
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External
Borders of the Member States of the European Union and the European Police Office
(2011), available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/flags/frontex.pdf.
169. See Frontex Signs Working Arrangement with Interpol, FRONTEX (May 29, 2009),
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/newsreleases/art63.html.
170. As of February 2011, FRONTEX had concluded working arrangements with the
competent authorities of fourteen third countries: Russia, Ukraine, Croatia, Moldova, Georgia,
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Montenegro, Belarus, Canada, Cape Verde, and the United States. Negotiations for eight
further working arrangements had been taking place at the time with the following countries:
Turkey, Libya, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Egypt, Brazil, and Nigeria. See External
Relations, FRONTEX, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/externaLrelations/ (last visited Jan. 20,
2012).
171. See infra Part IV.
37
38 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 19:1
travel.172 It is based on the continuous risk assessment of passengers at
various entry and exit points, as well as in advance of travel, and such
risk assessment is based on automaticity, with a negative assessment
potentially leading to failure to be accepted for travel or to pass an
automated gate. Along with its contribution to the extension of state
surveillance, the use of technology may thus lead to the prevention of
entry and challenge the rule of law by restricting the avenues for a legal
remedy in cases of denial of entry. The growing emphasis on the use of
technology for immigration control and the need for related issues to be
addressed as technical, rather than legal issues, further constitute
another level of depoliticization. In addition to the aspects of
immigration control discussed in the securitization section of this
Article, this section will highlight the above challenges by discussing
two further examples of technological immigration control: one in the
United States and one in the European Union.
As Rey Koslowski has noted, technology has been used by the DHS
as a "force multiplier" to increase border control capacity. 73 In this
context, in 2005 the DHS launched a new technology project designed to
monitor the border: the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). SBI is a
comprehensive, multiyear plan that, among other things, involves a
"systemic upgrading of the technology used in controlling the border,
including increased manned aerial assets, expanded use of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), and next-generation detection technology."174
SBInet had a bumpy ride, facing continued and repeated technical
problems, cost overruns and schedule delays,175 and was eventually
cancelled in January 2011. "In cancelling the program, [DHS Secretary,
Janet] Napolitano made clear that border enforcement would continue,
with continued 'boots on the ground' and more intensive 'point
defense'--deploying existing technology, such as surveillance drones,
radar, and sensors, in strategic locations."176 Notwithstanding the
challenges the use of technology for immigration control presented in
172. See also Huub Dijstelbloem, Europe's New Technological Gatekeepers: Debating the
Deployment of Technology in Migration Policy, 1 AMSTERDAM L. F., no, 4, 2009 at 11, 13
(arguing that "[bliometry can violate the integrity of the person or lead to the personal
body being regarded as an instrument").
173. Rey Koslowski, The Evolution of Border Controls as a Mechanism to Prevent Illegal
Immigration, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. 3 (2011).
174. Id. at 9.
175. See Koslowski, supra note 173; DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., Southwest Border Security
Technology: New Path Forward, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/pdfl
technologyPlan.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2012) (evaluating the results of the department-
wide assessment of the SBInet program).
176. Demetrios G. Papademetriou & Elizabeth Collett, A New Architecture for Border
Management, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., 10 (2011).
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the implementation of the program, the emphasis on the use of
technology for surveillance purposes remains.
At the EU level, the emphasis on technology is clearly reflected in a
Commission Communication on the "interoperability" of databases.'7 7
The purpose of the Communication was to highlight how, beyond their
present purposes, databases "can more effectively support the policies
linked to the free movement of persons and serve the objective of
combating terrorism and serious crime."178 On the basis of this
approach, the Commission argued strongly in favor of granting
"authorities responsible for internal security" access to immigration
databases including the VIS.179 The communication provided a
definition of "interoperability," which is the "ability of IT systems and of
the business processes they support to exchange data and to enable the
sharing of information and knowledge." 80 According to the Commission,
interoperability is a technical rather than a legal or political concept.18
This attempt to treat interoperability, which is a term now increasingly
used by EU institutions,18 2 as a merely technical concept, while at the
same time using the concept to enable maximum access to databases
containing a wide range of personal data (which become even more
sensitive with the sustained emphasis on biometrics) is a striking
attempt to depoliticize the issue and shield developments from the
enhanced scrutiny that the adoption of legislation in the field would
provide.a 3
The challenges of emphasizing technology as a tool for immigration
control in the European Union are further evident in recent proposals to
177. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on Improved Effectiveness, Enhanced Interoperability and Synergies Among
European Databases in the Area of Justice and Home Affairs, COM (2005) 597 final, (Nov.
24, 2005).
178. Id. at 2.
179. Id. at 8. The Commission also took the opportunity to float proposals for longer-
term developments, including the creation of a European Criminal Automated
Fingerprints Identification System, the creation of an entry-exit system and introduction
of a border crossing facilitation scheme for frequent border crossers, and European
registers for travel documents and identity cards. Id. at 8-9. On these developments, see
supra Part III.A.
180. Id. at 3.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Press Release, Justice and Home Affairs 2873d Council Meeting, 16
(June 5-6, 2008) (stating that pilot projects developing future EU border management
measures should allow for "maximum interoperability').
183. See Extraterritorial Immigration Control, supra note 128.
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develop a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).184 The
development of such a system was floated by the Commission in a
Communication published in 2008.185 According to this document,
It is necessary to envisage a common technical
framework to support Member States' authorities to act
efficiently at local level, command at national level,
coordinate at European level and cooperate with third
countries in order to detect, identify, track and intercept
persons attempting to enter the EU illegally outside
border crossing points (emphasis added).186
This passage expressly links technology, the intensification of
surveillance on the basis of intelligence, and prevention in EU
immigration control. This link is confirmed by subsequent Commission
proposals on how to take EUROSUR forward.187 The latter call for the
establishment of an "information sharing and cooperation mechanism
enabling Member States' authorities carrying out border surveillance
activities and FRONTEX to collaborate at tactical, operational and
strategic levels," (emphasis omitted)188 including the development of
"situational pictures" at the national and European level which will be
partly based on a "Common Pre-Frontier Intelligence Picture" managed
by FRONTEX.189 The Commission envisages the development of
EUIROSUR in eight steps: (1) providing the essential border surveillance
infrastructure at the national level; (2) establishing a communication
network between the national coordination centers including FRONTEX
(which will "provide communication tools and electronic data exchange
in order to send, receive and process non-classified and classified
information 24/7 close to real time"); (3) providing support to
neighboring third countries for the establishment of border surveillance
184. See generally Julien Jeandesboz, Beyond the Tartar Steppe: EUROSUR and the
Ethics of European Border Control Practices, in EUROPE UNDER THREAT? SECURITY,
MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION (J. Peter Burgess & Serge Gutwirth eds., forthcoming 2012).
185. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Examining
the Creation of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), COM (2008) 68 final
(Feb. 13, 2008).
186. Id. at 4.
187. Commission Staff Working Paper: Determining the Technical and Operational
Framework for the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and the Actions to
be Taken for its Establishment, at 3, SEC (2011) 145 final (Jan. 28, 2011).
188. Id. at 4.
189. Id.
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infrastructure;190 (4) focusing on research and development; (5)
developing common application of surveillance tools;191 (6) developing a
common prefrontier intelligence picture;192 (7) creating a common
information sharing environment for border control and internal
security purposes covering the Mediterranean Sea, the southern
Atlantic Ocean (Canary Islands), and the Black Sea; and (8) ultimately
creating "a common information sharing environment for the whole EU
maritime domain."193
The emphasis on technology, intelligence, and extraterritoriality is
evident in the Commission's vision of the development of EUROSUR.
Technology is to be used to establish a system of European border
surveillance that will be extended, in effect, to third countries.194 Key
elements of this system are the interconnection and interoperability of
databases and maximum information exchange, including between
civilian and military authorities. Extensive surveillance is thus to be
enabled by technology, with the aim of producing intelligence and
preventing entry into the European Union. Technology is thus used to
extend the reach and powers of the state with significant consequences
for the individuals affected by EUROSUR, both in terms of privacy and
data protection, and access to the territory of the European Union.
Notwithstanding these consequences, in the development of EUROSUR
190. According to the Commission,
[a] concrete example of how such support, leading to closer
cooperation, could be given is the SEASHORE network which is
operational between Spain, Portugal, Mauretania, Senegal and Cape
Verde. Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Morocco joined the SEAHORSE
network in November 2010. SEAHORSE could be used as a model for
setting up a similar network between Member States and
neighbouring third countries in the Mediterranean sea.
Id. at 7.
191. These surveillance tools consist of three components: "[tiracking of vessels on the
high seas"; "[p]unctual monitoring of selected neighbouring third-country ports and
coasts"; and "[m]onitoring external land borders and the pre-frontier area." Id. at 8.
192. This prefrontier intelligence picture consists of four components: "[olperational
information, e.g. on detected targets and alerts"; "[s]trategic key information, e.g. on
routes and methods used by traffickers"; "[k]nowledge base, i.e. a formalised description of
vocabulary and methods"; and "[blasic geodata, e.g. topographic and thematic maps and
nautical charts." Id. at 8.
193. The Common Information Sharing Environment's guiding principles are: "[a]n
approach interlinking all user communities"; "[b]uilding a technical framework for
interoperability and future integration"; "[i]nformation exchange between civilian and
military authorities"; and finally, "[s]pecific legal provisions." Id. at 9.
194. Cooperation with third countries has also been emphasized by the governments of
EU Member States. See Press Release, Justice and Home Affairs, (Feb. 25-26, 2008)
(noting five specific conclusions concerning the development of EUROSUR).
41
42 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 19:1
the establishment of a legal framework to regulate the use of technology
is merely an afterthought. 9 5
III. GLOBALIZATION AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The development of extraterritorial immigration control practices
has been a key tool for states to address perceived pressures from global
migration flows. Extraterritoriality in this context has a number of
advantages for states. On the one hand, it.extends the reach of the state
outside its territory with the aim of preventing access; on the other
hand, it may create gaps in the legal responsibility of states, as states
may claim that their domestic law or international obligations do not
apply outside their territory.196 Extraterritoriality in immigration
control has thus far been addressed in this Article on a number of
occasions: in examining prevention in the context of securitized
immigration control; in analyzing privatization, and in particular the
role of carriers; and, in the case of the European Union, in examining
the evolution of agencies and systems such as FRONTEX and
EUROSUR.
Extraterritorial immigration control practices are not uniform in
these examples. They can be differentiated using criteria such as their
territorial reach and their actual effect. In regards to territorial reach,
one can distinguish between extraterritorial immigration control on the
high seas (in international waters) and extraterritorial immigration
control taking place in agreement with (and in the territory of) third
countries. In regards to effect, one can distinguish between actual
operational intervention (e.g., by boarding a ship) and prevention of
access to the territory (e.g., by deflecting a boat or preventing boarding
in the territory of a third state on the basis of tracking of individuals
with intelligence obtained via surveillance). The challenges with regard
to determining the legal responsibility of states when exercising
extraterritorial immigration control are exacerbated in the case of the
European Union, where the division of power between FRONTEX and
Member States is not always clear.
In determining state responsibility for extraterritorial immigration
control, useful lessons can be drawn from the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. On a number of occasions, the
Strasbourg Court has attempted to clarify the extent of state
195. As seen above, a vague reference to "legal provisions" comes last on the list of the
guiding principles for a Common Information sharing environment for the whole EU
maritime domain.
196. For an overview of these challenges, see generally EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION
CONrROL: LEGAL CHALLENGES, supra note 126.
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responsibility for complying with the European Convention on Human
Rights when acting extraterritorially. In its recent ruling in Al-Skeini,
the court confirmed that in certain circumstances, the use of force by a
state's agents operating outside its territory may bring the individual
under the control of the state's authorities into the state's jurisdiction
under Article 1 of the Convention.'97 Reiterating its earlier case law, the
court added that "[wihat is decisive in such cases is the exercise of
physical power and control over the person in question" (emphasis
added).198
A case cited in Al-Skeini which is of particular relevance to the issue
of extraterritorial immigration control is Medvedyev.s99 The court ruled
that the Convention applied extraterritorially in enforcement actions by
France in a case of suspected drug trafficking on the high seas. As this
was a case of France having exercised "full and effective control" over
the boat in question and its crew, "at least de facto, from the time of its
interception, in a continuous and uninterrupted manner until they were
tried in France, the applicants were effectively within France's
jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention" (emphasis
omitted).200 The case is of relevance for extraterritorial immigration
control not only because it involved the use of force and actual
interception at sea, but also because this happened in a relative legal
vacuum with few developed international law rules in the field. The
court recognized this vacuum by stating that "it is regrettable . . . that
the international effort to combat drug trafficking on the high seas is
not better coordinated bearing in mind the increasingly global
dimension of the problem" (emphasis omitted)201 and found "that the
deprivation of liberty" in this case "was not 'lawful'. . . for lack of a legal
basis of the requisite quality to satisfy the general principle of legal
certainty" (emphasis omitted).202 The court rejected the French
Government's claim that interception on the high seas is a special case,
stating that
The special nature of the maritime environment relied
upon by the Government in the instant case cannot
justify an area outside the law where ships' crews are
covered by no legal system capable of affording them
enjoyment of the rights and guarantees protected by the
197. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2011).
198. Id. at 58-59.
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Convention which the States have undertaken to secure
to everyone within their jurisdiction, any more than it
can provide offenders with a "safe haven" (emphasis
omitted).203
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has thus attempted
to address the rule of law and fundamental rights issues arising from
the existence of gaps in legal protection in extraterritorial state acts by
expanding state jurisdiction under the Convention. The jurisprudence of
the court is particularly relevant in cases of extraterritorial immigration
control, as the court's approach, in effect, exports the border to places
and instances where the state exercises enforcement action. This
approach has been characterized as "functional." What matters is not a
generalized test of personal or geographical control, but rather the
specific power or authority assumed by the state acting
extraterritorially in a given capacity. 204 In this manner, extraterritorial
state action, either on the high seas and in international waters or in
the territory of a third state, is subject to human rights norms. In the
case of the European Union, this extension is of particular importance
in view of the prospective post-Lisbon accession of the European Union
to the European Convention on Human Rights. EU accession to the
ECHR will mean, inter alia, that EU institutions (including bodies and
agencies like FRONTEX) will be bound by the Convention.
What is less evident from this approach is whether these norms
apply in cases where there is no actual state enforcement action taking
place, but where there are attempts to deflect movement via the use of
surveillance extraterritorially (for instance via the use of EUROSUR) or
in cases where the attribution of responsibility is difficult because
multiple authorities are involved (particularly in cases of FRONTEX
operations, including cooperation with third states). An expansive
interpretation of jurisdiction will address these issues and remedy the
legal uncertainty stemming from gaps in legal responsibility. Such
expansive interpretation, broadening the causal link between state
intervention and the effect on the individuals concerned, has been put
forward by scholars such as Thomas Gammeltolft-Hansen, who has
argued that in the human rights context, jurisdiction in this sense flows
from the de facto relationship established between the individual and
the state through the very act itself, or the potential of acting (emphasis
added).205 In a similar vein (but focusing more specifically on the
203. Id. 81.
204. THOMAs GAMIMELTOFT-HANSEN, AcCESS TO ASYLUM INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
AND THE GLOBALISATION OF MIGRATION CONTROL 124 (2011).
205. Id. at 125.
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operation of FRONTEX and its relationship with Member States), Guy
Goodwin-Gill notes that:
Interception operations are initiated and coordinated by
the EU agency, Frontex, and collaboratively or
individually by EU Member States. Directly or
indirectly, they affect the rights of individuals, some or
many of whom may be in need of international
protection. Within the terms of the ILC articles on state
responsibility, particularly Article 4 and 6, interceptions
continue to be carried out in the exercise of
governmental authority by the state, or in the
equivalent exercise of its executive competence by the
EU's agency (emphasis added).206
Nothing in the evidence of practice to date reveals any break in the
chain of liability. Neither the on-board presence of a third-state official,
nor the use of joint patrols in which actual interception is undertaken
by a third state, disengage the primary actor from responsibility for
setting the scene that allows the result, if nothing more. In each case,
the EU agency or Member States exercise a sufficient degree of effective
control; it may not be solely liable for what follows, but it is liable
nonetheless. 207
IV. THE NEXUS BETWEEN SECURITY, DELEGATION AND
EXTRATERRITORIALITY: FROM IMMIGRATION CONTROL TO THE
SURVEILLANCE OF MOVEMENT IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD
The analysis thus far has attempted to demonstrate how
immigration control is being transformed in an era of globalization
following three major trends: the securitization of immigration and
mobility; the delegation of state power to the private sector, government
agencies, or databases; and the emphasis on extraterritorial
immigration control. This section will cast light on the nexus between
these trends by examining in detail the development of a global
legislative framework aimed at monitoring movement by the collection
and transmission of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data to state
authorities. Devoting a separate part specifically to PNR is necessary
for a number of reasons: it highlights the interconnections between the
206 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Right to Seek Asylum: Interception at Sea and the
Principle of Non-Refoulement, 23 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 443, 453 (2011).
207 Id.
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various immigration control trends analyzed above; it highlights how a
global paradigm of immigration control has emerged following
unilateral U.S. action and subsequent transatlantic convergence; it
demonstrates the more general shift from immigration control on the
physical border focusing only on foreigners to generalized
extraterritorial surveillance aimed at citizens and foreigners alike; and,
in the light of all of the above, it demonstrates how globalized
immigration controls have strengthened the state at the expense of
human rights. To highlight the above issues, the analysis in this Section
will follow the various legal and policy steps from the introduction of
PNR requirements in U.S. law to the reaction of the European Union,
the achievement of transatlantic convergence, and the push toward
global standards.
A. U.S. Law Post-9/11
As seen above, the surveillance of movement and passenger flows
has been a key component of U.S. counterterrorism strategy post-9/11.
Globalization and extraterritoriality have been central in the
development of U.S. law and policy in the field. In a DHS strategy
document, it was stated expressly that "the increasing mobility and
destructive potential of modern terrorism has required the United
States to rethink and rearrange fundamentally its systems for border
and transportation security" and that border security must be conceived
as "fully integrated requirements because our domestic transportation
systems are intertwined inextricably with the global transport
infrastructure."208 This focus on globalization was reaffirmed by the
then-U.S. DHS Secretary, Tom Ridge, who noted that "[a]s the world
community has become more connected through the globalization of
technology, transportation, commerce and communication . . . the
benefits of globalization available to peace loving, freedom loving people
are available to the terrorists as well."209 Not only immigration, but also
mobility and movement via globalization have thus been securitized.
In this light, the United States passed legislation in November 2001
requiring air carriers operating flights to, from, or through the United
States to provide U.S. Customs with electronic access to data contained
in their automatic reservation and departure control systems. 210 This
data, known as Passenger Name Records (PNR), constitutes a record of
208. OFFICE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 42, at 21.
209. Louise Amoore, Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror, 25
POL. GEOGRAPHY 336, 339 (2006).
210. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 44909 (2004); Correction of Air Cargo Manifest or Air Waybill, 19
C.F.R. § 122.49 (2005).
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each passenger's travel requirements and contains all the information
necessary to enable reservations to be processed and controlled by the
booking and participating airlines. Transfer of such information to the
U.S. authorities before departure has been a key element of the U.S.
border security strategy, focusing on identification and prevention. PNR
data can include a wide range of details, from the passenger's name and
address to their email address, credit card details, and on-flight dietary
requirements. The transfer of PNR data was deemed to be key to the
operation of the U.S. Automated Targeting System (ATS), which uses a
wide range of databases, including law enforcement and FBI databases
to assess and identify "travelers that may pose a greater risk of terrorist
or criminal activity and therefore should be subject to further scrutiny
or examination." 211
B. The Response of the European Commission
The U.S. legislation mentioned above was applicable to all flights to
the United States, including flights from the European Union. European
airlines would thus have to comply with the legislation if they did not
want to be subject to heavy fines or even to the cancellation of landing
rights at U.S. airports. EU Member States did eventually agree in 2003
on a directive requiring carriers to transmit passenger data, but this
directive covered the transmission of data for journeys to the European
Union and required the transmission of much more limited categories of
personal data (API data, namely data that can be found primarily on
the passport).212 Notwithstanding the fact that the API Directive was
adopted under Title IV and its stated aim was to combat illegal
immigration, there have been attempts by the U.K. government during
negotiations to frame it also as a national security and counterterrorism
matter (and thus align it with its domestic approach on border security
and e-borders). 213 However, in spite of the adoption of the API Directive,
concerns were voiced in the European Union that U.S. PNR legislation
211. See generally DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., A Report Concerning Passenger Name
Record Information Derived from Flights Between the U.S. and the European Union, 38
(Dec. 18, 2008). It has been noted that the ATS generates a risk assessment score for each
traveler. See Shachar, supra note 62.
212. Council Directive 2004/82, 2004 O.J. (L 261) 24 (EC); see also Mitsilegas, supra
note 66 (analyzing the directive).
213. Caroline Flint, then a Home Office Minister, argued that the proposal "is all about
border control, whether it is illegal immigration or criminals coming in, or people who are
a threat to national security." House of Lords E.U. Select Comm., Fighting Illegal
Immigration: Should Carriers Carry the Burden?, 5th Report, Sess. 2003-04, HL Paper 29,
at 1 9 (2004).
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was too invasive of privacy and could be in conflict with the European
Community's and Member States' data protection standards. 214
The Commission informed the U.S. authorities of these concerns
and this led to the entry into force of the U.S. legislation being
postponed until March 5, 2003. Negotiations were protracted and lasted
well beyond March 5, 2003, when U.S. law formally entered into force
vis-A-vis EU airlines. They resulted in an agreement between the
Commission and the U.S. authorities on December 16, 2003. Following a
series of undertakings by the U.S. authorities, the Commission accepted
that U.S. data protection standards in the context of PNR transfers
were adequate. The Commission expressed this in a communication
issued that day, justifying its decision by stating that
[tihe option of insisting on the enforcement of the law on
the EU side would have been politically justified, but ...
would have undermined the influence of more moderate
and co-operative counsels in Washington and
substituted a trial of strength for the genuine leverage
we have as co-operative partners. 215
The Commission called for a global EU approach to the sharing of
PNR data. On the issue of transfers between the European Union and
the United States, the Commission noted that the way forward was to
establish a legal framework for existing PNR transfers to the United
States. This would consist of an "adequacy" decision by the Commission,
certifying that the U.S. data protection standards were adequate,
followed by a "light" bilateral, international agreement between the
European Community and the United States. Although the U.S.
legislation was prompted by the 9/11 events and is viewed in the United
States as a counterterrorism measure, in the European Union it was
dealt with as a first-pillar internal market measure and not as a third-
pillar counterterrorism measure. Making the most of its mandate, the
Commission was arguably trying to consolidate its position as the
European Union's and Member States' chief representative in
negotiating standards in the field-it does not seem accidental that the
communication on PNR also calls for a "global" EU approach in
negotiating standards in international fora, such as the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), where, presumably, it will be the
214. See Mitsilegas, supra note 66.
215. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament Transfer
of Air Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data: A Global EU Approach, at 5, COM (2003) 826
final (Dec. 16, 2003).
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Commission and not the Council or Member States that will take the
lead.
C. The EU-U.S. PNRAgreements
The Commission's handling of the PNR dossier revealed a two-fold
agenda: to establish a first-pillar competence for external action in the
field and, linked with this, to emerge as a global actor, acting on behalf
of the Community, negotiating with the United States, and developing
global standards and cooperation in the field. The saga following these
negotiations is clear. A first-pillar EC-U.S. PNR Agreement allowing the
transfer of PNR data to the United States was signed in the face of vocal
opposition from the European Parliament, expert data protection bodies,
and civil society. In the decision authorizing the conclusion of the
agreement, 216 the Council invoked the urgency caused by the
uncertainty for carriers and passengers. 217 The decision was preceded by
the Commission's decision confirming the adequacy of U.S. data
protection standards, which was finally adopted on May 14, 2004.218 The
terms of the Agreement and the U.S. undertakings have not changed
from the draft that was so heavily criticized in the Article 29 Working
Party on Data Protection and the European Parliament.219
The European Parliament brought an action before the European
Court of Justice (ECJ), asking for annulment of the decision authorizing
the conclusion of the EC-U.S. Agreement, on the grounds of
infringement of the right to privacy and data protection, breach of the
principle of proportionality, and legality grounds. 220 In November 2005,
the Advocate-General expressed the view that, while the agreement and
decision did not cause fundamental rights concerns, the adequacy
decision of the Commission and the decision authorizing the signature
of the agreement had to be annulled since the agreement dealt
primarily with fighting terrorism (i.e., a third- and not a first-pillar
216. Council Decision 2004/496, 2004 O.J. (L 183) 83 (EC).
217. Id.
218. Commission Decision 2004/535, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11. For Undertakings of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, see id. at 15-21. For the annexed list of PNR, see id. at
22.
219. See generally Border Security in the European Union, supra note 73.
220. The European Parliament argued that the then Art. 95 EC Treaty (on the internal
market) was not the right legal basis for the contested decision. It also argued that its
assent should be required for the adoption of the decision authorizing the conclusion of the
international agreement and not its mere consultation, as has happened. According to the
Parliament, the agreement constituted an amendment of the 1995 data protection
directive. See Council Document No. 11876/04 of 6 August 2004, 2, 2,
www.statewatch.org/news/2004/aug/pnr-court.pdf.
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matter).221 The court issued its ruling in May 2006222 and annulled the
agreement on legality grounds. According to the court, the transfer of
PNR constituted a security (third-pillar) matter and not an internal
market (first-pillar) matter.
The annulment of the agreement resulted in the conclusion of an
interim third-pillar agreement, and finally in 2007, of a third-pillar EU-
U.S. PNR agreement. 223 This agreement 224 has done little to address
concerns with regard to the adequacy of U.S. privacy standards. Like
the earlier texts, the agreement includes an adequacy assessment-the
United States is deemed to ensure an adequate level of PNR data
protection for PNR data transferred from the European Union-that is
linked with the issue of transmission of "EU" PNR data to third
countries. The adequacy assessment means that the European Union
"will not interfere with relationships between the United States and
third countries for the exchange of passenger information on data
protection grounds." 225 Moreover, in a statement reminiscent of the one
in the EU-U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, the parties
recognize that "US and European privacy law and policy share a
common basis and that any differences in the implementation of these
principles should not present an obstacle to cooperation between the
U.S. and the EU."226 The preservation of the U.S. standards is also
ensured by a provision making clear that the agreement is not intended
to derogate from or amend existing U.S. (and EU) law, and expressly
states (as in earlier texts) that the agreement "does not create or confer
any right or benefit on any other person or entity, private or public."2 27
The agreement also seems to be creating, on the basis of reciprocity, a
common level of data protection between the two parties: the DHS
"expects that it is not being asked to undertake data protection
221. Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-317/04, Parliament v. Council, 2006
E.C.R. 1-4721.
222. The Parliament was supported by the European Data Protection Supervisor, while
the Council was supported by the Commission and the United Kingdom. Id.
223. See Valsamis MVitsilegas, The External Dimension of EU Action in Criminal
Matters, 12 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 457, 484-87 (2007) [hereinafter The External
Dimension of EU Action in Criminal Matters].
224. Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the
Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement), 2007 O.J.
(L 204) 18 [hereinafter 2007 PNR Agreement]; see also Council Decision 2007/551, 2007
O.J. (L 204) 16 (EU) (approving the 2007 PNR Agreement on the basis of Articles 24 and
38 of the Treaty of the European Union).
225. 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 224, at 19.
226. Id.; see also The External Dimension of EU Action in Criminal Matters, supra note
222.
227. 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 224, at 20.
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measures in its PNR system that are more stringent than those applied
by European authorities for their domestic PNR systems" and vice-
versa.228
Widespread transfer of personal data to the United States is
authorized. Although the text of the agreement itself does not include
details of the PNR data transfer per se, these are set out in a separate
"US letter to the EU," signed by the then-Secretary of Homeland
Security, Michael Chertoff, which accompanies the agreement.229 The
letter enumerates nineteen types of PNR data covered by the
Agreement (these are more or less similar to the broad categories in the
earlier agreements and include data such as payment information, seat
information, and "general remarks").230 U.S. government authorities
with law enforcement, public security, or counterterrorism functions can
access this data and transfer it to government authorities in third
countries. 231 The agreement also contains provisions regulating the
move, under certain conditions, from a "pull" to a "push" system for
PNR data transfer 232 and provisions defining its purpose as fighting
terrorism and other serious crimes. The agreement leaves open the
option of unilateral broadening by the United States of its scope.233 The
letter also extends the retention period of PNR data essentially to a
minimum of fifteen years-seven years in an "active analytical
database" and a further eight years in dormant status. 234 This provision
has encountered a critical reaction in the European Parliament, which
raised its concern that such databases lead to "a significant risk of
massive profiling and data mining."235 The European Data Protection
228. Id. at 19. See also the Letter from Michael Chertoff, US Secretary of Homeland
Security, to Luis Amado, President of the Council of the European Union, discussing the
reciprocity arrangements of the 2007 PNR Agreement, contained therein. Id. at 21.
229. Id. This is in turn followed by an "EU letter to the US" confirming that, on the
basis of the assurances provided in the U.S. letter, the European Union deems that the
United States ensure an adequate level of data protection and that, based on this finding,
"the EU will take all the necessary steps to discourage international organizations or third
countries from interfering with any transfers of EU PNR data to the United States." Id. at
25.
230. Id. at 21-22.
231. Id. at 21.
232. Id. at 23-24.
233. By stating that "DHS will advise the EU regarding the passage of any US
legislation which materially affects the statements made in this letter." Id. at 21.
234. Id. at 23.
235. Resolution on the PNR Agreement with the USA, EUR. PARL. Doc. P6 0347, 1 20
(2007).
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Supervisor has also raised concerns, 236 as has the Article 29 Working
Party on Data Protection.237
D. The Internalization of the U.S. Model by the European Union
By insisting on concluding PNR Agreements with the United States
on the terms described above, the European Union has made the first
step toward the establishment of a global model of securitized
extraterritorial immigration control based on the surveillance of
movement via its compliance with the demands of foreign law. However,
global convergence in PNR standards has not been limited to legal texts
aiming to accommodate domestic demands. Notwithstanding sustained
concerns raised by the European Parliament and specialist EU data-
protection bodies with regard to the compatibility of the EU-U.S. PNR
agreements with EU privacy and data protection law, there is ongoing
political momentum for the development of an internal, EU PNR
system, where EU law will require (as a minimum) airlines flying into
the European Union to submit PNRs to the authorities of EU Member
States.
1. EU PNR Before the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty
The first Commission proposal for an EU PNR system dates back to
2007, when the Commission tabled a proposal for a Framework Decision
establishing a similar system of transmission of PNR data by carriers
flying into the European Union.238 The Commission justified the
proposal as a result of the "policy learning" from the existing PNR
Agreements with the United States and Canada, as well as the
development of pilot projects in the United Kingdom. According to the
Commission, both of these developments (involving countries, in
particular the United States and the United Kingdom, that have pushed
forward a specific concept of "border security" linked with technology
236. See Comment of the European Data Protection Supervisor on International Data
Exchange Agreements (Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://www.edps.europa.eulEDPSWEB/
webdav/site/mySite/sharedlDocuments/Consultation/Comments/2010/10-01-
25_EUUSdataexchangeEN.pdf.
237. See Comment of the European Data Protection Supervisor on International Data
Exchange Agreements (Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://www.edps.europa.eulEDPSWEB/
webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Comments/2010/10-01-
25_EUUSdataexchangeEN.pdf.
238. Commission Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the Use of Passenger
Name Record (PNR) for Law Enforcement Purposes, COM (2007) 654 final (Nov. 6 2007).
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and the fight against terrorism) have demonstrated the potential of
PNR data for law enforcement purposes.239
Along with the concerns raised in the context of the EU-U.S. PNR
saga, one could question the necessity and added value of an essentially
similar system at the EU level. After all, as mentioned above, there is
recent legislation at the EU level on the transfer of API data adopted
under an immigration legal basis. Mindful of this criticism, the
Commission attempted, in the Explanatory Memorandum to the PNR
proposal, to distinguish between the two initiatives. The Commission
notes that
[flor the purposes of the fight against terrorism and
organised crime, the information contained in the API
data would be sufficient only for identifying known
terrorists and criminals by using alert systems. API
data are official data, as they stem from passports, and
sufficiently accurate as to the identity of a person. On
the other hand, PNR data contains more data elements
and are available in advance of API data. Such data
elements are a very important tool for carrying out risk
assessments of the persons, for obtaining intelligence
and for making associations between known and
unknown people. 240
From this passage, it is clear that the Commission has adopted an
intelligence-led model of border controls very similar to the "border
security" models in the United States. The emphasis is on risk
assessment and profiling by collecting a wide range of personal data at
the earliest possible stage in time. From the limited categories of
passport data to be transmitted prior to departure under the API
Directive, we are now moving to the transfer of a wide range of
information related to air passengers at a considerably earlier stage.
The transfer of PNR data is viewed as necessary not only for border
controls and immigration, but also for broader counterterrorism and
security purposes.241
239. Id. at 2.
240. Id. at 3.
241. See HOME OFFICE, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM ON EUROPEAN LEGISLATION,
6007/11 (Feb. 16, 2011), available at http://amberhawk.typepad.com/files/lords-home-
office-memo-select-cttee-report-on-pnr.pdf (noting the need "to allow the processing and
exchange of PNR data for wider border security and crime-fighting purposes"). The U.K.
government further advocated a wider scope to the proposal than the one envisaged by the
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2. Post-Lisbon Developments
Since agreement on the 2007 Commission proposal was not
reached before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the
Commission tabled a new text after the entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty, this time in the form of a directive. 242 The Commission again
stresses the law enforcement use of PNR data, distinguishing between
reactive use (use in investigations, prosecutions after the fact), real-
time use (use prior to arrival or departure for crime prevention), and
proactive use, stating:
use of the data for analysis and creation of assessment
criteria, which can then be used for a pre-arrival and
pre-departure assessment of passengers. In order to
carry out such an analysis of relevance for the
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of
terrorist offences and serious crime, a commensurate
period of retention of the data by law enforcement
authorities is necessary.243
The Commission adds that "PNR data enable law enforcement
authorities to identify persons who were previously 'unknown'. i.e.
persons previously unsuspected of involvement in serious crime and
terrorism." 244 The link between the collection and transfer of PNR data
and preventative risk assessment is further highlighted. As the
Commission notes,
The use of PNR data prior to arrival allows law
enforcement authorities to conduct an assessment and
perform a closer screening only of those persons who are
most likely, based on objective assessment criteria and
previous experience, to pose a threat to security. This
facilitates the travel of all other passengers and reduces
the risk of passengers being subjected to examination
upon entry into the EU on the basis of unlawful criteria
Commission. See EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, SEVENTH REPORT, 2007-8, H.C. 16-vii,
at 40-41 (U.K).
242. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Use of Passenger Name Record Data for the Prevention, Detection, Investigation,
and Prosecution of Terrorist Offences and Serious Crimes, COM (2011) 32 final (Feb. 2,
2011).
243. Id. at 3-4.
244. Id. at 4.
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such as nationality or skin colour which may wrongly be
associated with security risks by law enforcement
authorities, including customs and border guards. 245
Under this justification, the collection of passenger data serves to
establish a system of generalized surveillance of movement for security
purposes, with a wide range of passenger data being required (as in the
case of U.S. law) to be communicated to state authorities.246 This
represents a clear shift from immigration control to the surveillance of
foreigners and citizens alike. Border controls are thus disaggregated,
with everyday passenger data being collected at various instances in
time. The combination of these data, along with other categories of data
collected in an era of securitized immigration control for risk
assessment purposes, has profound consequences for the affected
individuals, whose "dangerousness" is to be assessed regularly.
Conscious of these implications, the Commission argues that this
system will avoid racial profiling, while at the same time facilitating the
movement of bona fide passengers. The Commission's argument as
regards to profiling is questionable, as the PNR system is clearly
established for the purpose of constant risk assessment.247 The
implications for privacy and nondiscrimination in this context are
significant, as are the implications for citizenship. By prioritizing the
convenience argument, the Commission is aiming at making increased
surveillance of everyday life acceptable to citizens, as they believe that
"it will not be them," but others who are controlled. 248
245. Id. at 5.
246. Requested data includes all forms of payment information, including billing
address, travel status of passenger (including confirmations), check-in status, no show or
go show information, seat number and other seat information, number and other names of
travelers on PNR, and "general remarks." See id. at 32.
247. See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Use of Passenger Name
Record Data for the Prevention, Detection, Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Offences
and Serious Crime, at 4-5 (Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.edps.europa.eul
EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2011/11-03-
25_PNREN.pdf (noting that "the 'assessment' of passengers (previously worded 'risk
assessment) will be performed on the basis of constantly evolving and non transparent
criteria').
248. See generally Valsamis Mitsilegas, Security Versus Justice: The Individualisation of
Security and the Erosion of Citizenship and Fundamental Rights, in JUSTICE AND
SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LIBERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAw (Synnove
Ugelvik & Barbara Hudson eds., forthcoming Jan. 2012) (describing the impact of
arguments of convenience for the reconfiguration of the relationship between the
individual and the state on the one hand and between citizens on the other).
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E. A Global Approach
The reaction of the European Union to U.S. law with regard to the
collection and transmission of passenger data has evolved from finding
a way to comply with U.S. requirements while respecting EU law to
accepting the U.S. model in principle and attempting to contribute
toward the development of a global system of passenger surveillance.
The emphasis on the globalization of the surveillance of movement has
been confirmed by the European Commission's publication of a
communication on developing a global approach to PNR data transfers
to third countries.249 This subsection will focus on this gradual
development of global standards in the field from an EU perspective.
1. From Unilateral U.S. Demands to Transatlantic Convergence
The internalization of the U.S. model of the surveillance of
movement by the European Union via the establishment of a
European PNR system may be seen as a significant political move by
EU institutions to ensure real reciprocity with the United States
(indeed, U.S. airlines would be subject to these standards, and the
adoption of EU standards in the field will trigger the application of the
various reciprocity clauses in the PNR Agreement). However, this
move also means that the European Union is essentially importing the
whole U.S. model of intelligence-led, generalized surveillance based on
profiling via the gathering of a wide range of everyday information on
all passengers for security purposes. While negotiations on the scope
and content of the instrument are difficult and ongoing, it is
noteworthy that one of the issues being discussed is extending the
system to intra-European Community flights, leading thus to the
generalized surveillance of air travel within the borderless Schengen
area. 250 After the ECJ ruling, and in a clear convergence of EU with
U.S. approaches, measures of monitoring movement via the collection
and transmission of PNR data are directly justified on the grounds of
counterterrorism. Immigration law thus becomes terrorism law and is
used to regulate everyday legitimate mobility. Framing of the proposal
as a counterterrorism measure not only results in the weakening of
privacy protection inside the European Union (with the third-pillar
privacy and data protection framework being fragmented and limited
to say the least) but also sits uneasily with the proclaimed freedom of
249. Commission Communication on the Global Approach to Transfers of Passenger
Name Record (PNR) Data to Third Countries, COM (2010) 492 final (Sept. 21, 2010)
[hereinafter Transfers of PNR].
250. See Press Release, Justice and Home Affairs Council, at 18 (Oct. 24, 2008).
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movement within the European Union.251 If adopted, the EU PNR
system will signify a striking convergence of immigration control
models between the European Union and the United States (and, as
will be seen below, major industrialized Western countries such as
Australia and Canada), a convergence based on the adoption of a
model of a securitized control of movement emphasizing prevention on
the basis of risk assessment.
2. Ongoing Bilateralism: Common Criteria for EU Negotiations
with Third Countries
The development of a globalized model of passenger data transfer is
further promoted by the continuation of EU negotiations for
international agreements with third states in the field. In its
communication on a "global approach," the Commission put forward a
set of general criteria that should form the basis of future negotiations
of PNR agreements with third countries. The development of a global
approach in this context was justified, inter alia, on the basis of the
need to fight terrorism while respecting fundamental rights: to provide
legal certainty to carriers, to ensure coherence between the various EU
external commitments, and to contribute in increasing passenger
convenience. 252 This approach was confirmed by the EU Council on
Justice and Home Affairs, which agreed that the mandates for the
forthcoming negotiation of PNR agreements between the European
Union and the United States, Canada, and Australia should be identical
in content and adopted at the same time.253 It remains to be seen
whether the European Union will achieve coherence as regards to the
content of these three agreements and coherence between the
international agreements and internal EU law. 254 In this context, the
adoption of internal EU PNR law may provide a benchmark, but this
must always be viewed within the general constitutional and human
rights framework of European Union law.
251. See generally The Borders Paradox, supra note 93.
252. Transfers of PNR, supra note 249, at 6.
253. See Press Release, Justice and Home Affairs Council, at 11 (Oct. 7-8, 2010).
254. At the time of writing, the European Union appears to be close to an agreement
with Australia. See Council Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the
Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the Processing and Transfer of
Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the Australian Customs and Border
Protection Service, COM (2011) 281 final (May 19, 2011).
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3. The Goal of Multilateralism: The Development of Global PNR
Instruments
The ultimate strategic aim of the European Commission is the move
from the conclusion of bilateral PNR agreements between the European
Union and third states to the adoption of global instruments in the field.
The Commission in its communication invites the European Union to
consider initiating discussions with international partners that use
PNR data and those that are considering using such data, in order to
explore whether there is common ground between them for dealing with
PNR transfers on a multilateral level. The move towards
multilateralism is justified as follows:
As more and more countries in the world use PNR data,
the issues arising from such use affect the international
community. Even though the bilateral approach which
has been adopted by the EU was the most appropriate
one under the circumstances and seems to be the most
appropriate one for the near future, it risks ceasing to be
appropriate if many more countries become involved
with PNR. The EU should therefore examine the
possibility of setting standards for the transmission and
use of PNR data on an international level. The
Guidelines on PNR access that have been developed by
ICAO in 2004 offer a solid basis for the harmonisation of
the modalities of transmissions of PNR data. However,
these guidelines are not binding and they deal
insufficiently with data protection issues. They are
therefore not sufficient in themselves, but should rather
be used for guidance, especially on matters affecting the
carriers. 255
If the Commission's strategy bears fruit, we will have moved from a
unilateral model of surveillance (the post-9/11 U.S. model) to a
multilateral acceptance of this model in principle via the efforts of the
European Union. In an era where PNR collection and transfers are a
reality, the Commission's move towards multilateralism may have the
advantage of strengthening the position of the European Union as a
global actor in criminal and security matters, while at the same time
promoting a global system of PNR collection, transfer and exchange that
will be governed by a high level of fundamental rights safeguards-after
255. Transfers of PNR, supra note 249, at 10.
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all, the European Union is under the duty, after Lisbon, to promote its
internal values (including respect for the rule of law and fundamental
rights) in external relations. 256 However, the move from the unilateral
to the multilateral (via bilateral convergence) signifies that the heavily
securitized post-9/11 approach consisting of maximum and generalized
surveillance of everyday life via the monitoring of movement is here to
stay.
CONCLUSION
Globalization has presented significant challenges to the state in
terms of how to maintain the integrity of its border and control who
enters its territory. As Saskia Sassen has noted, the border is now
"embedded in the product, the person, and the instrument: a mobile
agent endogenizes critical features of the border . .. there are multiple
locations for the border, whether inside firms or in long transnational
chains of locations that can move deep inside national territorial and
institutional domains."25 7
This Article has attempted to demonstrate that this movement of
the border in multiple locations (including both outside and inside of the
physical territorial border) has resulted in the strengthening, rather
than the weakening, of the state. The reach of the state has been
extended considerably, both in terms of its powers over the individual
and in terms of its territorial reach. The sphere of substantive criminal
law has been expanded to include global, new offenses (such as
trafficking and smuggling of human beings); state databases have been
extended and interlinked, containing both more (and increasingly
stemming from legitimate, everyday transactions) and more sensitive
(in the form of biometrics) personal data; the securitization of movement
has meant that state intervention has been extended from immigration
control of third-country nationals to the generalized surveillance of
foreigners and citizens alike; the state is supported in its control
functions by both the private sector and specialized agencies and
databases; it is also supported by third countries and exercises control
beyond its physical border, extraterritorially. In this manner, state
power is increasing while state responsibility is diminishing:
enforcement action is not "state" action, but action by a private
company, an agency, an IT system; enforcement action is not
256. See Valsamis Mitsilegas, Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation After
Lisbon, 2010 EUCRIM 111.
257. SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES 416 (2008).
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undertaken within the territory of the state, but outside its jurisdiction
(on the high seas, in the territory of a third state).
The implications of this strengthening of the state for the affected
individuals are considerable. Access to asylum is seriously impeded by
making it extremely difficult for third-country nationals to reach the
territory where they can lodge a claim; the emphasis on risk assessment
increases the risk of discrimination; the collection, storage, and use of
everyday, sensitive personal data challenges the rights to private life
and data protection; immigration law is also used for citizens and
criminal law to regulate immigrant flows; citizens and companies are
asked to assume enforcement functions and to cooperate with the state
to keep out undesired individuals; extensive and routine risk
assessment of persons undertaking everyday, legitimate activity (i.e.,
travel or mobility) is justified on the grounds of convenience and
inclusion (for the "trusted traveler"). In challenging fundamental rights
and citizenship in this manner, immigration control in an era of
globalization weakens the citizen. This weakening is exacerbated by the
gaps in legal protection and accountability arising from the fact that the
expansion of the reach of the state has not been accompanied by the
development of detailed legal rules and safeguards regulating this
expansion. Courts, most notably in Europe, have started to address this
rule of law deficit. In the absence of detailed rules setting limits to the
power of the state in this context, legal certainty and the protection of
the individual leave much to be desired.
